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Abstract
Although there seems to be a broad consensus among economists that purely floating or
completely fixed exchange rates (the so-called corner solutions) are the only viable alternatives
of exchange rate management, many countries do not behave according to this paradigm and
adopt a strategy within the broad spectrum of exchange rate regimes that is limited by the two
corner solutions. These intermediate regimes are characterized by significant foreign exchange
market interventions of central banks and a certain degree of exchange rate flexibility. We
develop a new empirical methodology that identifies three different forms of floating on the
basis of a central bank's intervention activity: pure floating (no interventions), independent
floating (exchange rate smoothing), and managed floating (exchange rate targeting). Our cross-
country study shows that exchange rate targeting is at least as important as exchange rate
smoothing. Subsequently we present a monetary policy framework in which central banks use
the exchange rate as an operating target of monetary policy. We explain the mechanics of
interventions and sterilization and we explain why a central bank has an interest of controlling
simultaneously the exchange rate and the short-term interest rate. We derive the monetary policy
rules for our two operating targets from a simple open economy macro model in which the
uncovered interest parity condition and the Monetary Conditions Index play a central role.
JEL classification: E 52, F 31, F 33, F 41
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1  Introduction
In spite of their prominence, the exchange rate regimes of “floating” or “managed floating” have
so far received relatively little academic interest. Due to this “fear of floating” of many
researchers
1, until today even the central terms “floating” and “managed floating” lack a clear
and widely shared definition. We will show that this can lead to some confusion which is
especially problematic for the option of managed floating. Above all a precise definition would
make clear that this approach is conceptually completely different from the textbook model of
flexible exchange rates and also the more refined models of open economy inflation targeting. In
other words, because of this semantic imprecision it has been overlooked that managed floating
lacks a well-developed theoretical framework. As a consequence a central bank which wants to
follow the popular approach of managed floating can receive almost no guidance for its concrete
monetary and exchange rate policies.
2 The lack of a positive as well as a normative theory of
managed floating can also lead to negative effects at the international level. While the
international monetary order is now dominated by managed floating, there has been no
theoretical discussion whether such uncoordinated national exchange rate and interest rate
policies will always lead to optimum outcomes for the global economy.
The paper is organized as follows: In Chapter 2 we present three different definitions of floating:
•   Pure floating is an arrangement where the exchange rate is almost always market
determined; in other words, the central bank normally refrains from exchange market
interventions. As a benchmark for pure floating, we use the exchange rate policy of the
United States.
•   Independent floating is characterized by an active intervention policy which aims at a
stabilization around a market-determined given trend of the exchange rate.
•   Managed floating is also characterized by an active intervention policy. In this case a
central bank’s intervention policy follows an unannounced target path for the exchange
rate.
                                                
1 While there was some discussion of this issue in the 1980s, in the last few years there are almost no publications
with a title that is directly related to exchange rate system of floating or managed floating; for instance, in EconLit
since 1990 only 17 publications can be found under “managed float” and 21 publications under “managed
floating”.
2 See Fischer (2001, p. 7) about foreign exchange market interventions in system of managed floating: “This is one
of the remaining areas in which central bankers place considerable emphasis on the touch and feel of the market,
and where systematic policy rules are not yet common.”2
On this basis we develop a simple method for identifying these three different forms of floating.
Compared with the methods by Calvo and Reinhart (2000), our approach has the advantage that
it allows a clear demarcation between the three variants of floating.
In Chapter 3 we give a short survey of the literature. We show that the Mundell/Fleming model
as well as the more refined models for open economy inflation targeting are unable to explain the
high intervention activity of many central banks which is geared towards achieving a certain
exchange rate path.
In Chapter 4 we present a simple theoretical framework for managed floating. It is based on the
somewhat unfamiliar notion of using the exchange rate as an operating target of monetary policy
in addition to the short-term interest rate. We analyze the conditions under which such an
exchange rate targeting is possible. In the central part of this Chapter we show how in an open
economy a central bank has to set its two operating targets in order to achieve simultaneously
•   internal equilibrium which defined by an MCI which minimizes a social loss function,
•   external equilibrium which is defined by a combined interest and exchange rate policy
that is compatible with uncovered interest parity.
The last part of Chapter 4 discusses the shortcomings and implications of managed floating. As
managed floating is characterized by an unannounced exchange rate path, a separate anchor for
private sector expectations is required in small open economies. We argue that – in the same way
as in large economies – inflation targeting can provide a substitute for this function. A major
shortcoming of managed floating is the limited ability of central banks to defend an exchange
rate path in a situation of strong speculative outflows. Such shocks would require a policy-mix
with very high real interest rates that can lead to negative effects for the domestic sector of an
economy. For this case credit facilities in the form of the IMF’s Contingent Credit Line are the
only adequate solution. Finally, under an uncoordinated managed floating countries can
manipulate the exchange rate in order to improve their international competitiveness. The strong
increase in dollar reserves of emerging market economies during the 1990s indicates that such
considerations have played an important role in the exchange rate management of these
countries.3
In Chapter 5 we take a deeper look at the actual monetary and exchange rate policy of a few
countries in our sample that we identify as managed floaters in Chapter 2. With a rather
descriptive approach we investigate whether these countries effectively pursue a policy
according to the rules which we derive formally in Chapter 4.
The last Chapter summarizes the main results and concludes.
2  Defining and identifying three forms of floating
2.1  “Floating”: the predominant exchange rate regime in the New Millennium
In the last decade the international monetary order has undergone a dramatic transformation.
Intermediate regimes which had been the prevailing exchange rate arrangement in the early
1990s are now only used by about one third of the IMF’s member countries (see Table 1). In the
group of developing and emerging market economies the decline has been even more
pronounced. For the country groupings of all countries and of emerging market economies
floating has been the preferred alternative to intermediate regimes. Table 1 shows that for all
three country groupings floating has become the predominant exchange rate arrangement. Hard
pegs could also profit from the “vanishing middle”, especially in developing countries, but their
market share remains much lower than the share of floating.
Table 1: Exchange rate arrangements 1991 and 1999
Hard Pegs Intermediate Floating
Year 1991 1999 1991 1999 1991 1999
All countries 16% 24% 62% 34% 23% 42%
Emerging market
economies
6% 9% 64% 42% 30% 48%
Developing and emerging
market economies
5% 25% 65% 27% 29% 47%
Source: Fischer (2001)
In the literature this “hollowing out” has been widely welcomed and is even recommended as an
optimum solution for almost all countries (Fischer 2001, Frankel 1999, Summers 2000). Barry
Eichengreen (1999, p. 105) has become a specially prominent promoter of this approach:
“Hence, the IMF needs to more forcefully encourage its members to move to policies of
greater exchange rate flexibility, and the sooner the better. With few exceptions it should
pressure its members, in the context of Article IV consultations and program discussions, to4
abandon simple pegs, crawling pegs, narrow bands and other mechanisms for limiting
exchange rate flexibility before they are forced to do so by the markets.”
2.2  Three forms of floating
As Table 1 shows, in many policy-related discussions the spectrum for exchange rate
arrangements is reduced to the three central options of “hard pegs”, “intermediate regimes”, and
“floating”. While this gives some impression on the main choices, an understanding of managed
floating requires a more detailed classification. In our view, the IMF’s International Financial
Statistics classification of exchange regimes is quite useful in this regard. It uses the following
eight categories:
a.  Exchange rate arrangements with no separate legal tender (dollarisation, membership in a
currency union)
b.  Currency board arrangements
c.  Other conventional fixed peg arrangements (formal or de facto peg with a narrow margin of
at most ±  1 per cent around a central rate)
d.  Pegged rates within horizontal bands (formal or de facto peg with margins that are wider than
±  1 per cent around a central rate)
e.  Crawling pegs (the currency is adjusted periodically in small amounts at a fixed, pre-
announced rate or in response to changes in selective quantitative indicators)
f.  Crawling bands (the currency is maintained within certain fluctuation margins around a
central rate that is adjusted periodically in small amounts at a fixed, pre-announced rate or in
response to changes in selective quantitative indicators)
g.  Managed floating (no pre-announced path for the exchange rate; the monetary authority
influences the movement of the exchange rate through active intervention in the foreign
exchange market without specifying, or pre-committing to, a pre-announced path for the
exchange rate)
h.  Independent floating (the exchange rate is market determined, with any foreign exchange
market intervention aimed at moderating the rate of change and preventing undue
fluctuations in the exchange rate, rather than establishing a level for it)
At least from a theoretical point of view it seems useful to add an additional category:5
i.  Pure floating (the exchange rate is market determined with no foreign exchange market
intervention at all; changes in foreign exchange reserves are due to technical factors only).
As already mentioned, many authors summarize the arrangements g), h), and i) under the
heading of “floating”. This can create the impression that the economic rationale of these three
arrangements is more or less identical. However, a careful reading of the IMF’s description of g)
and h) and of our category i) shows a very important difference:
•   Managed floating implies that the exchange rate path is determined by the central bank
(or the government).
•   Pure and independent floating imply that the exchange rate path is mainly market
determined.
In other words, what distinguishes managed floating from the intermediate solutions e) and f) is
not a different form of exchange rate determination, it is mainly the fact that there is no
preannounced path for the exchange rate (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Exchange rate regimes
classification of exchange rate regimes
exchange rate is mainly market
determined
↓
pure and independent floating
exchange rate is mainly determined



















As a consequence, for a theoretical understanding of managed floating it is not sufficient to treat
it simply as a variant of independent or pure floating, for which the elaborate theories of flexible
exchange rates are available. The very fact, that under managed floating central banks try to
target the exchange rate requires a positive analysis of this policy, as well as a normative theory
designing policy rules for managed floating.
2.3  Governments do not always tell the truth
The need for a precise definition of floating exchange regimes applies not only to economists. As
the research by Calvo and Reinhart (2000) has shown, national governments and/or central banks
do not seem to pay too much attention to the exact definitions in the IMF’s forms. The starting
point for Calvo and Reinhart is the textbook model of flexible exchange rates (or our option
“pure floating”) which is characterized by a constant level of foreign exchange reserves.
Therefore, Calvo and Reinhart identify “floating” (in our taxonomy: “pure floating”) by a high
probability that the monthly per cent change in foreign exchange reserves falls within a ±  1 or ±
2.25 per cent band. As there are always technically determined changes in reserves, Calvo and
Reinhart use the data of the United States and Japan as a benchmark. In other words, a lower
probability for small reserve changes is regarded as an indication that a country is not following
a policy of floating (in or taxonomy; “pure floating”). The polar case of fixed exchange rates is
characterized by a low probability that the monthly per cent change in nominal exchange rate
falls within a ±  1 or ±  2.25 per cent band. Again, the United States and Japan are used as a
benchmark. Table 2 presents the main results of the study by Calvo and Reinhart
Table 2: Main results of the Calvo and Reinhart (2000) study










3 16.2 33.9 51.8 79.4
Managed floating 17.8 39.2 60.1 87.5
Limited flexibility 20.8 45.9 64.6 92.0
Fixed 15.4 36.5 83.1 95.9
USA 28.6 62.1 26.8 58.7
Japan 44.8 74.3 33.8 61.2
Source: Calvo and Reinhart (2000)
                                                
3 Excluding Japan and the United States7
The most striking result of this study is the very small difference between the polar options of
independent floating and fixed rates as far as the changes in foreign exchange reserve volatility
are concerned. In addition the independent floaters behave completely different than the two
benchmark countries. The same applies to the category “managed floating”. In other words, most
of the countries which classify themselves as independent or managed floaters are actively
intervening on the foreign exchange market. The exchange rate volatility of independent and
managed floaters is also much lower than in the United States and Japan and if is analyzed
within the ±  2.25 per cent band, the difference to fixed rates is not very pronounced, especially
for managed floating.
In sum, the results of Calvo and Reinhart as well as of a related study by Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzenegger (2000) show that it is important to make a clear distinction between the textbook
ideal of “free floating” and the reality of “independent” and “managed floating”.
2.4  A different approach for identifying three variants of floating
While the study by Calvo and Reinhard has contributed to a much better understanding of
“floating”, it has the important drawback that it cannot distinguish between the three different
forms of floating. Another problem of this study is that it analyses very long periods (up to
February 1973 – April 1999). This can have the disadvantage that a singular strong intervention
activity or changes in intervention behavior in the more recent past cannot not be identified.
Finally the Calvo/Reinhart study normalizes changes in reserves by relating them to reserve
levels. This can be misleading if countries start an intervention period with different reserve
levels although their overall macroeconomic data are roughly similar or if countries accumulate
large reserve levels over time.
2.4.1  A new method for measuring different forms of floating
In order to avoid these short-comings, we present a new methodology for identifying different
forms of floating. We start with two different methods to proxy the intervention activity of a
country:
1.  changes in foreign reserves minus gold (Res) as a ratio of the external sector’s size
measured by a twelve-month moving-average of the arithmetic mean of imports (Im) and
exports (Ex);8
2.  changes in foreign reserves minus gold (Res) as percentage of the level of reserves at the
beginning of the underlying period.
The first normalization procedure has the advantage that changes in reserves are related to the
size of a countries’ external sector. To some extend this also takes into account differences in the
total economic size. The second method was chosen to produce results that are comparable to
those of the Calvo/Reinhart study.
As a first step we want to identify the overall intervention activity of a country. For this purpose
we add the absolute values of normalized changes in reserves for a period of n=6 and of n=12
months. Thus, we do not discriminate between the monthly values of net sales and net purchases
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The superscripts 1 and 2 refer to the method of normalization. If S
abs is low (i.e. approaching
zero), a country’s overall intervention activity is low. As in Calvo and Reinhart (2000) we chose
the U.S. as a benchmark which we assume to be a pure floater.
The difference between the two methods of normalization can be illustrated quite easily with the
four charts of Figure 2. In the upper two charts we depicted the proxies for the intervention
activity S
abs1 and S
abs2 for Japan and the US. While the two lines differ only slightly in the case
of the US, the differences in the conclusion that one would draw in the case of Japan are striking.
According to the thin line (method 2) the Japanese exchange rate policy would be judged as a
non-interventionist one, similar to what results for the US. In the study of Calvo and Reinhart
(2000) which uses a similar technique (monthly change in foreign exchange reserves as a
percentage of the level of reserves) Japan is classified as even more independently floating than
the US (see Table 2). The major problem with this approach is the bias that emerges with an9
increasing level of reserves. The same sale or purchase of foreign exchange measured in US
dollars becomes less important the higher the base in terms of which the percentage change is
measured. From the lower two charts we can see that the Japanese authorities accumulated large
amounts of foreign reserves during the last two decades (the figures depicted are in millions of
US dollars). The average rate of growth amounted to a multiple of the rate of growth of the
external sector. In contrast to this, the two variables seem to have a common long-run trend in
the US so that the measurement bias described above does not occur. This explains why the two
methods approximately yield the same results for the US. In order to eliminate such a bias, in the
following we only use the second normalization method.




































































































































































































































































































































































(exports + imports) / 2 total reserves minus gold
In a second step we calculate the sum of effective changes (S
eff1, S
eff2) of reserves again for a 6
and a 12 month period:






















0 i 1 i t 1 i t
1 i t
























− − − ∑ −
= .
We then divide the sum of effective changes by the sum of absolute changes of reserves for each
normalization method and for each time horizon. The resulting ratio allows us to differentiate
between independent floaters and managed floaters. We therefore labeled it index of floating
(I
float):
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I
float assumes values ranging from minus one to plus one. A value close to zero indicates that a
central bank has not changed its total level of reserves during an observation period. As this is
compatible with a high value of the denominator, a low value of I
float shows that interventions
were mainly carried out in order to smooth short-term fluctuations around an exogenously
determined trend. This behavior is typical for a strategy of independent floating as it is defined
by the IMF.
A value of I
float close to plus or minus one implies that the intervention activity was associated
with a change in reserves during the observation period. This can be regarded as an indication
that a central bank has tried to influence the trend of the exchange rate. Thus, such values of I
float
can be regarded as a marker for managed floating. In addition, the sign of this indicator shows
whether the central bank has tried to intervene against an appreciation (a positive sign: net
purchases of the central bank) or a depreciation (a negative sign: net sales of the central bank) of
its currency.
2.4.2  Data description and proceeding
Our sample consists of 14 developed market economies and 30 emerging market economies
4 that
have been classified as independent or managed floaters according to the IMF’s quarterly
                                                
4 We distinguish between developed market economies and emerging market economies as in Fischer (2001). This
restriction allows us to concentrate on the subset of developing countries which are integrated with world capital11
Exchange Rate Arrangements published in the International Financial Statistics (IFS). Our data
is monthly from January 1975 to November 2000. The variables used in our calculations are all
from the IFS. Reserves (Res) are measured by “Total Reserves minus Gold” (line 1l.d), exports
and imports by line 70 and 71. If the latter were denominated in national currency, we converted
them into US dollars with the average monthly dollar exchange rate (line rf).
For each month during the period that a country reports its exchange rate regime as an
independent or a managed floater we calculated the two variables of interest S
abs and I
float. The
periods and the reported regimes are summarized in Table 8 (see Appendix 1: Country
coverage). Since some countries followed different exchange rate strategies in the whole period,
we get a total of 65 cases for the 6-month horizon and 62 cases for the 12-month horizon. We
then computed the frequency distribution of each variable for each period.
For our classification of exchange rate regimes we proceed as follows. In a first step we try to
find out whether a country is a pure floater or not. For this purpose we look at the value of S
abs of
our benchmark country, the United States. We see that for both time horizons there is a 100 %
probability that the sum of absolute reserve changes is less than the average of the sum of
monthly imports and exports during the observation periods (i.e. S
abs ≤  1.0, see Table 10 and
Table 11 in Appendix 2: Probability distributions). For the 6-month horizon the United Kingdom
(09/92-11/00), Canada and Poland (04/00-11/00) can also be regarded as pure floaters. For the
12-month horizon only the United Kingdom (09/92-11/00) can qualify as a pure floater; for
Poland the experience with floating is not long enough.
For those countries which cannot be not classified as pure floaters we try to identify whether
their intervention policy can be classified as independent or managed floating. For this purpose
we use the index floating. We assume that a range of –0.33 < I
float <  0.33 describes independent
floating; the ranges of –1 ≤  I
float ≤  –0.33 and 0.33 ≤  I
float ≤  1 are regarded as a policy of managed
floating. If the probability of –0.33≤  I
float <  0.33 is at least 50 %, we classify a country as an
independent floater, if it is lower a country is classified as a managed floater. Since we lack a
benchmark country, the interventions of the United States are to small to be used for this
                                                                                                                                                            
markets. As we were also interested in the exchange rate policy of the Eastern European accession countries, we
additionally included Slovenia in our analysis.12
purpose, we had to chose these critical values somewhat arbitrarily. Figure 3 gives an overview
of this classification procedure.
Figure 3: A classification of floating exchange rate systems




Prob(Sabs = 1) < 1
↓
other floating









2.4.3  Main results
A summary of the results of our classification is presented in Table 3 and Table 4 (for the
detailed country results see Table 12 and Table 13 in Appendix 2: Probability distributions). For
the 6-month observation period they show that most floating countries can be regarded as
managed floaters regardless whether we focus on all regimes that were in existence in the whole
period from 1975 until 2000 or on those there are still in existence. Only 23 % of the IMF’s
independent floaters are pure floaters or independent floaters according to our classification. For
the 12-month observation period a more even distribution between independent and managed
floating emerges. Again there is no strong correlation with the IMF’s classification: only 48 % of
the IMF’s independent floaters were true independent floaters and only 46 % of the managed
floaters were true managed floaters. Thus, depending on the observation period our analysis
shows first that managed floating is either the most widely used form of floating or a more or
less equally important form of floating as independent floating.13





Independent float 4 (4) 3 (2) 24 (15) 31 (21) IMF
classification Managed float - 4 (0) 31 (10) 35 (10)
Sum 4 (4) 7 (2) 55 (25) 66 (31)
Note: The figures in brackets indicate the number of regimes that are still in existence.





Independent float 2 (2) 11 (8) 14 (10) 27 (20) IMF
classification Managed float - 19 (6) 17 (4) 36 (10)
Sum 2 (2) 30 (14) 31 (14) 63 (30)
Note: The figures in brackets indicate the number of regimes that are still in existence.
The importance of managed floating becomes even more obvious if we use our methodology for
the analysis of time series. Thus, we can observe for each country how the values of S
abs and I
float
vary over time. Of course this approach has the effect that even with a low overall probability
situations with high values of S
abs can be reached from time to time. The most interesting case is
Japan. According to the cross-section analysis which covers the period from 1975 to 2000 the
probability for high interventions in Japan is relatively low so that Japan is not very different
from the pure floaters (see Table 10 and Table 11 in Appendix 2: Probability distributions).
However, the time series for Japan show a quite different picture (see Figure 2). Especially in the
years 1999 and 2000 its intervention activity is very high and it is associated with values of I
float
that exceed +0.33 for most of the time which clearly indicates that the Japanese authorities
targeted an exchange rate path (see Figure 13 in Appendix 6: Selected case studies). In other
words, there has been a clear regime change which cannot be detected 
.with the approach of
Calvo and Reinhart or any other forms of a cross-section analysis. Thus, an analysis of time
series of the two intervention indicators has the advantage to filter out episodes of high
intervention activity and episodes of low intervention activity within the whole period
considered as well as episodes where exchange rate targeting (managed floating) or exchange
rate smoothing (independent floating) prevailed. Moreover it allows us to identify changes in the
intervention policy of a country. In Chapter 5 we will present some selected case studies of
countries that we identified as managed floaters.14
3  What can we learn from the literature?
The empirical analysis shows that there three different approaches under the general heading of
floating. While pure floating and independent floating are more or less discussed in the extensive
literature on flexible exchange rates, there has been astonishingly little theoretical discussion of
managed floating. Above all it is unclear
•   why countries try to target the exchange rate directly,
•   how the exchange rate can be controlled effectively, and
•   how the exchange rate paths should be determined that are targeted under managed
floating.
The first question leads to the old debate about fixed versus flexible rates that we do not want to
discuss here. In our view an important explanation of the widespread use of managed floating is
the very weak statistical relationship between macroeconomic fundamentals and a floating
exchange rate. In the words of Jeffrey Frankel and Andrew Rose (1995, p. 1709):
“To repeat a central fact of life, there is remarkably little evidence that macroeconomic
variables have consistent strong effects on floating exchange rates, except during
extraordinary circumstances such as hyperinflations.”
The low interest in the second and third question seems mainly due to the semantic confusion
that was already mentioned. Since most economists do not differentiate between the three forms
of floating they seem to believe that the so-called inconsistency triangle provides already a
sufficient framework for a analysis of the relevant arrangements in exchange rate policy.
According to this metaphor a country can choose between the following options (see Figure 4):
•   a fixed exchange rate with a lack of an autonomous interest rate policy and free capital
mobility,
•   an autonomous interest rate policy with a freely floating exchange rate and free capital
mobility,
•   capital controls and a combination of a fixed exchange rate and an autonomous interest
rate policy .15
Figure 4: Inconsistency triangle
capital mobility




I: fixed exchange rates
II: pure floating
III: capital controls
As the effectiveness of controls for capital inflows and outflows is very limited, at least on a
sustained basis (Ariyoshi et al. 2000), the menu is reduced to the first two options.
The main problem of this presentation is its focus on the polar solutions of either absolutely
fixed or absolutely flexible exchange rates (pure or independent floating). In other words it has
nothing to say about a policy of managed floating where the exchange is
•   neither fixed, since it is targeted along an unannounced exchange path,
•   nor flexible in the sense of a market-determined rate, since the central bank intervenes in
order to keep the exchange rate close to the target path.
3.1  The Mundell-Fleming legacy
The theoretical framework for the inconsistency triangle is the well-known Mundell-Fleming
model which is the workhorse for almost all textbooks on open economy macroeconomics. But
in spite of its popularity the model is not very well designed for a world of managed floating. As
a comparative-static model it cannot cope with dynamic processes in exchanges rates, i.e.
exchange rate paths and exchange rate expectations. In other words, the polar view presented in
the inconsistency triangle is not so much a result of sound theoretical reasoning but rather the16
outcome of an outdated economic model which by its very nature cannot deal with policy
options other than absolutely fixed or absolutely flexible exchange rates.
In addition, the standard textbook presentation of the Mundell-Fleming model only focuses on a
domestic monetary policy that tries to follow a more expansionary interest policy than in the
anchor currency country. Thus, it overlooks the more interesting situation of a central bank that
follows a more restrictive policy which leads to capital inflows and an increase in foreign
exchange reserves. In this context the scope for sterilized interventions is also not sufficiently
analyzed. We will discuss this in more detail below.
3.2  Open economy inflation targeting
Managed floating is a major challenge not only to the old fashioned but also to more elaborate
models of international macroeconomics. Important models with monetary policy rules for open
economies have been presented by Ball (1999b) and Svensson (2000). Both authors base their
papers on a textbook view of free floating.
Svensson (2000) assumes that the flexible exchange rate is determined even in the short-run by a
variant of the absolute purchasing power parity (PPP) and by the uncovered interest rate parity
(UIP). As a result, foreign exchange market interventions are not discussed as an independent
monetary policy instrument.
However, both textbook assumptions are not compatible with the empirical evidence. It is well-
known that pricing-to-market can lead to strong deviations from PPP in the short-run (see Rogoff
1996). The systematic deviations of exchange rate changes (“forward discount bias”) from UIP
have been discussed in many papers (see Froot and Thaler 1990). In other words, if a central
bank follows the policy rule prescribed by Svensson, it has to be aware of the fact that it relies on
unrealistic exchange rate theories. This discrepancy between the Svensson model and the reality
can be regarded as an explanation of why there is so much foreign exchange market intervention
by central banks although the model implicitly assumes that such transactions are not necessary.
The paper by Ball (1999b) uses a rather simple structure for the international linkages of an open
economy. Instead of the UIP it simply assumes a positive relationship between the real exchange
rate qt and the domestic real interest rate rt which can be disturbed by shocks ν t:17
(7) qt = θ  rt + ν t.
Of course, this description of the reality is even more problematic than the Svensson model since
it disregards the foreign interest rate. In addition, for short-term foreign portfolio investments it
is not the real but the nominal interest rate that matters. Real interest rate differentials are
relevant for international portfolio decisions only if PPP holds all the time.
Nevertheless, the Ball paper provides an important building bloc for a theory of managed
floating. It presents a monetary policy rule for an open economy which is based on the Monetary
Conditions Index (MCI) as a “policy instrument”. In Chapter 4.2.1 we will introduce the MCI
concept more formally. Ball defines the MCI as a weighted average of the real interest rate and
the real exchange rate and derives it from the minimization procedure of a central bank’s loss
function. He correctly states:
“The rationale for using an MCI is that it measures the overall stance of policy, including the
stimulus through both r and e [the real exchange rate in his notation; the authors]. Policy
makers shift the MCI when they want to ease or tighten.” (Ball, 1999b, p. 131)
But subsequently he specifies his policy rule as follows:
“When there are shifts in the e/r relation - shocks in equation (3) [our equation (7); the
authors] - r is adjusted to keep the MCI at the desired level.”
In other words, even though he accepts the central role of the exchange rate for monetary policy
in an open economy, he grounds his theory on a purely floating exchange rate system where the
only instrument of monetary policy is the interest rate.
In sum, the models by Ball and Svensson cannot provide a theory of managed floating since they
do not take into account the lack of a stable relationship between macroeconomic fundamentals
and the exchange rate which is the very rationale of managed floating. As a consequence, both
models disregard the role of foreign exchange market interventions (in the sense of managed
floating) as an independent monetary policy instrument. In Chapter 4.4.3 we will come back to
their understanding of monetary policy in small open economies and we will present the strategy
of independently floating exchange rates and its major flaws within the scope of the open
economy model that we are going to introduce in Chapter 4.18
3.3  John Williamson’s proposals
John Williamson is the most prominent promoter of intermediate exchange rate systems, above
all in the form of crawling peg (Williamson 1996), and more recently in the BBC-variant
(Williamson 2000) which calls for wide bands, a basket peg and a crawl.
If managed floating is interpreted as a form of a non-announced exchange rate path,
Williamson’s proposals come relatively close to it. However, there are also some important
differences. First, Williamson proposes a very specific form of an exchange rate path: the active
crawl, which is characterized by a rule that depreciates the domestic currency vis-à-vis the
foreign currency (or a basket of foreign currencies) according to
•   the difference between the targeted domestic and the foreign inflation rate minus
•   a factor which takes into account differences in the domestic and the foreign productivity
growth (Ricardo-Balassa-effect).
We will see in Chapter 4.4.2 that the active crawl is only a very specific variant of a managed
float which does not necessarily lead to optimum macroeconomic outcomes.
A second difference between the reality of managed floating and Williamson’s proposals
concerns the role of interventions. Williamson favors a very cautious attitude towards exchange
market interventions which becomes evident in his preference for “soft buffers”. As our
empirical analysis has shown, many central banks follow a much more offensive approach since
they do not hesitate to intervene for prolonged period of time and with large amounts of money.
4  A theoretical framework for managed floating
Our very short survey of the literature has shown that so far no comprehensive theory of
managed floating is available. In order to explain the actual intervention behavior of central bank
such a theory should be able to explain two things:
•   the role of the exchange rate as an independent operating target of monetary policy (see
Chapter 4.1);19
•   the interaction of the exchange rate and interest rate policy which is required to guarantee
simultaneously the achievement of an internal and an external equilibrium (see Chapter
4.2).
4.1  The exchange rate as an operating target of monetary policy
The starting point for a theory of managed floating is the role of the exchange rate as an
operating target of monetary policy. This role, which has not been acknowledged in the literature
so far, can be explained in a very direct analogy to the operating target role of the short-term
interest rate:
•   With open-market operations a central bank exchanges short-term domestic notes against
domestic central bank reserves in order to target the short-term interest rate.
•   With  foreign exchange market interventions a central bank exchanges foreign sight
deposits against domestic central bank reserves in order to target the exchange rate.
In both cases the operating target is controlled directly by interventions in the relevant market
(domestic money market, foreign exchange market).
While it is uncontested today that central banks are able to perfectly control short-term interest
rates, many economists are in doubt that a direct control of the exchange rate is possible at all.
They either argue that this due to the sheer size of foreign exchange markets or that a control of
the exchange rate can only be achieved with a limited control over the interest rate which is
normally not acceptable (Schwartz 2000). Or, to put it the other way round, if both instruments
are assumed to be independent from each other due to complete sterilization of the liquidity
effects of foreign exchange market interventions, then interventions are deemed to be ineffective.
Finally sterilized intervention can be associated with interest rate costs that a central bank is not
willing to accept. In the following Chapters we will discuss these points more in detail.
4.1.1  The flow channel of interventions matters
The effectiveness of foreign exchange market interventions has been discussed in many
theoretical and empirical studies. The results are mixed especially for the case of sterilized
interventions (Samo and Taylor 2001). The most serious flaw of this literature is that almost all
papers analyze the mark-dollar rate. As we have shown in the empirical part of our paper,20
interventions in this market have been extremely small so that the lack of a firm empirical
evidence for the effectiveness of such interventions can simply be explained with an insufficient
dose of intervention. In other words, analyses of the mark-dollar rate cannot be taken as an
evidence for the ineffectiveness of managed floating in emerging market economies and other
developed countries where the relative amount of interventions is in some case several times
higher (see Table 10 and Table 11 in Appendix 2: Probability distributions).
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The microeconomics of intervention can be described with a simple diagram for the foreign
exchange market (see Figure 5). On the y-axis is the price of foreign exchange in terms of the
domestic currency. Thus, there is an upward-sloping supply curve and a downward-sloping
demand curve for foreign exchange. The equilibrium exchange rate is S0. Foreign exchange
market intervention implies that the central bank targets a higher or a lower exchange rate than
the market-clearing rate. If the central bank targets a rate S1 that is higher than the equilibrium
rate, there is an excess supply of foreign exchange which it has to buy in exchange for domestic
reserves. As a result its net foreign assets (NFA) will grow. In the case of a targeted rate S2
below the market-clearing rate, there is an excess demand for foreign exchange which the central21
bank has to satisfy by selling foreign assets out of its foreign exchange reserves (∆ NFA<0). As a
consequence the commercial banks’ reserves decline. As far as the effectiveness of interventions
is concerned there is no doubt that the central bank can target a different exchange rate than S0 as
long as it is able to fill the gap between the quantity demanded and the quantity supplied in
disequilibrium.
Of course the ability to target S1 is completely different than the ability to target S2. In the first
case which identifies an intervention policy that tries to target a weaker exchange rate than the
market rate the, central bank’s foreign exchange reserve increase. In the second case which
characterizes an attempt to keep the exchange rate at a stronger level than market-clearing level,
the central bank loses foreign exchange reserves. Thus, in the first case there is no limit to the
intervention policy since the central bank can always increase the domestic liquidity. In the
second case, the central bank operates under a “hard budget constraint” which makes it difficult
to pursue such an intervention policy over a prolonged period of time.
As far as the size of the foreign exchange market is concerned, the figures of a daily transactions
volume of about 2,000 billion dollar are related to the market-maker principle by which the
foreign exchange market is organized. Due to this principle which generates a “hot potato effect”
(see Appendix 3: The market maker principle), an individual transaction can lead to a multiple of
foreign exchange market turnover. Thus, central bank interventions at much smaller scales can
be successful. For instance, in the period from June 1999 to June 2000 the Bank of Japan
managed to stop a further appreciation of the yen with a total intervention volume of about 100
billion dollar, which is only 5 % of the daily global transactions volume.
This is also confirmed by the data for local foreign exchange turnover. They show that because
of its role of a vehicle currency on the foreign exchange market the dollar turnover is extremely
high compared to the stock of total foreign reserves or the size of the external sector of the
United States. For many emerging market economies, however, the relative size of the turnover
is considerably smaller so that central banks can affect the exchange rate with relatively small
intervention volumes (see Table 5, columns 2 and 3). We calculated for example that the
turnover measured as a percentage of the external sector’s size was on average more than three
times higher in developed market economies compared to emerging markets.22
Table 5: Size of local foreign exchange markets
Average daily
turnover of local
currency in the local
foreign exchange
market in millions of
US-$ (April 1998)
Column 1 as a
percentage of total
reserves minus gold
(1998, end of year)
Column 1 as a
percentage of the
external sector's size
(1998) as defined in
Chapter 2.4
Column 1 as a
percentage of the
GDP (1998, in US-
$)
1234
Australia 23600 161.20 39.05 6.47
Austria 3014 13.44 4.62 1.43
Belgium 10706 58.59 6.31 4.28
Canada 25869 110.99 12.43 4.25
Denmark 5564 36.45 12.00 3.20
Finland 2566 26.47 6.82 1.99
France 32634 73.65 10.97 2.26
Germany 62145 83.95 12.27 2.89
Hong Kong 18711 20.87 10.44 11.50
Ireland 3569 37.98 6.53 3.99
Italy 22500 75.28 9.71 1.89
Japan 124045 57.57 37.20 3.26
Luxembourg 1637 21.41 8.93
Netherlands 18651 87.08 9.59 4.92
New Zealand 4928 117.23 39.81 9.23
Norway 5350 28.75 14.12 3.67
Portugal 2983 18.85 9.45 2.79
Singapore 17644 23.55 16.43 21.27
Spain 13007 23.54 0.02 2.35
Sweden 6285 44.58 44.58 44.58
Switzerland 31611 76.74 42.44 12.03
United Kingdom 114817 356.45 39.12 8.12
United States 315872 446.68 38.84 3.59
Argentina 2173 8.78 7.51 0.73
Bahrain 21 1.95 0.61 0.34
Brazil 5127 12.04 9.18 0.65
Chile 1212 7.74 7.21 1.66
China 211 0.14 0.13 0.02
Czech Republic 4169 33.24 15.13 7.48
Greece 5361 30.71 31.55 4.42
Hungary 554 5.95 2.28 1.18
India 1389 5.08 3.64 0.33
Indonesia 972 4.28 2.55 1.03
Malaysia 660 2.58 1.00 0.91
Mexico 8543 26.87 11.61 2.03
Philippines 492 5.33 1.61 0.75
Poland 1315 4.97 3.55 0.83
Russia 4728 60.60 6.82 1.70
Saudi Arabia 1422 10.00 4.14 1.11
South Africa 7289 167.30 0.86 0.18
South Korea 2289 4.40 2.03 0.72
Thailand 2574 8.93 5.29 2.30
Source: BIS (1999), IFS, own calculations
4.1.2  Sterilized interventions can be effective
This leads to the second argument which is raised against foreign exchange market interventions.
If a central bank intervenes in order to keep its currency from appreciating (depreciating), it
increases (reduces) domestic liquidity which ceteris paribus is identical with a more
expansionary (restrictive) monetary policy stance. Due to this direct connection it is often argued23
that any attempt to control the exchange rate is associated with a reduced control over the
interest rate. For instance, Anna Schwartz (2000, p. 26) concludes:
“(...) monetary policy can support either domestic or external objectives. Monetary policy
cannot serve both.”
This argument neglects the fact that most central banks dispose over different instruments with
which they can mop up the excess liquidity that is created by foreign exchange market
interventions. As Table 6 shows such a policy of sterilization is very common in those countries
that we identified as managed floaters (see Table 13 in Appendix 2: Probability distributions).
For each country we estimated the following sterilization equation:
(8) ∆ NDAt = β 1∆ NFAt + β 2∆ NDAt-1 + ut.
Table 6: Sterilization coefficient in managed floating economies
Dependent variable: ∆ NDAt
Explanatory variables Statistics
∆ NFAt ∆ NDAt-1 R
2 DW n
Argentina -1.05 (-17.64)*** 0.56 (14.42)*** 0.81 2.24 121
Australia 2 -0.66 (-9.89)*** 0.13 (2.22)** 0.37 1.89 202
Brazil 1 -0.92 (-19.95)*** -0.12 (-2.50)** 0.89 1.66 53
Brazil 2 -0.88 (-8.21)*** -0.18 (-1.70)* 0.61 2.02 46
Brazil 3 -1.13 (-4.39)*** -0.29 (-2.00)* 0.59 2.32 21
Bulgaria -0.77 (-29.07)*** -0.27 (-7.25)*** 0.98 1.50 21
Chile 1 -0.23 (-3.87)*** -0.21 (-3.06)*** 0.06 1.80 200
Colombia 1 -0.76 (-10.20)*** -0.35 (-5.02)*** 0.56 2.24 96
Egypt -1.03 (-18.24)*** -0.04 (-0.87) 0.72 1.94 134
Finland -0.44 (-5.36)*** -0.14 (-1.28) 0.41 2.01 47
India 1 -0.76 (-3.57)*** -0.19 (-2.53)** 0.03 1.99 167
India 2 -0.26 (-1.65) -0.13 (-1.26) 0.05 2.02 91
Indonesia 2 -0.91 (-21.81)*** 0.00 (0.03) 0.94 2.45 34
Israel 1 -0.77 (-3.85)*** 0.18 (1.19) 0.28 1.56 35
Israel 2 -0.67 (-8.88)*** -0.09 (-1.17) 0.43 2.17 106
Japan -0.94 (-4.91)*** -0.47 (-9.55)*** 0.27 2.41 306
Korea 2 -1.09 (-15.75)*** -0.04 (-0.64) 0.85 2.40 34
Malaysia -0.77 (-4.96)*** 0.10 (0.84) 0.37 1.95 56
Mexico 1 -0.95 (-16.11)*** -0.13 (-2.64)*** 0.72 1.98 103
Peru -0.57 (-8.88)*** -0.18 (-2.63)*** 0.42 2.18 124
Poland 1 -0.89 (-13.36)*** -0.20 (-3.23)*** 0.68 2.17 80
Singapore -0.83 (-16.88)*** 0.02 (0.44) 0.56 2.43 154
Slovenia -1.01 (-31.40)*** -0.11 (-3.44)*** 0.92 2.69 88
Sri Lanka -0.85 (-18.95)*** -0.20 (-4.78)*** 0.59 2.35 262
Thailand 2 -0.29 (-1.20) 0.09 (0.53) 0.06 1.90 31
UK 1 -1.05 (-15.00)*** -0.05 (-0.81) 0.80 2.39 61
Venezuela 1 -0.83 (-6.55)*** -0.04 (-0.40) 0.50 2.09 47
Note: OLS estimation, t-values in parentheses, *** (**) [*] = significant at the 1 (5) [10] per cent level; for
Bulgaria, Colombia 1 and UK 1 only quarterly data was available for the whole period;24
Under complete sterilization the coefficient β 1 of the change in net foreign reserves (∆ NFAt) is
expected to be -1, for net domestic credit (∆ NDAt) is systematically varied to offset the effect of
reserve acquisitions and losses on domestic liquidity.
5 Ten of the 27 managed floaters had a
sterilization coefficient smaller than –0.90, and for 19 of them it was less than –0.70.
How does sterilization work in practice? For the case of an intervention that increases domestic
liquidity the sterilization can be achieved as follows:
•   As long as the banking system is a net debtor of the central bank, credits to the banking
system can be reduced in parallel with foreign exchange market interventions. An
instrument which is especially suitable for that purpose are the ECB’s security repurchase
agreements with a maturity of up to two weeks that are conducted on a weekly basis.
•   For the case of interventions that exceed this form of sterilization a central bank has to
issue interest-bearing short-term notes with which the excess liquidity can be neutralized.
A similar and even more simple instrument is the deposit facility which has been
established by the European Central Bank (see ECB 2000). Such an interest bearing
facility has the advantage that it provides a sterilization potential that is unlimited, at least
in principle. So far, this instrument is not very common with other central banks, but it is
not a major technical problem to establish such a facility which is simply an additional
interest-bearing account for each commercial bank with the central bank.
In this context it is important to note that the literature uses two different definitions of
sterilization which depend on the domestic operating target of the central bank. If a central bank
uses the monetary base as its operating target, sterilization means that the amount of monetary
base is not affected by interventions. Based on this definition the estimation presented in Table 6
was made. If a short-term interest rate (overnight rate, one or three month rate) serves as the
domestic operating target, sterilization has to guarantee an unchanged level of this rate. As
almost all central banks in the world use the interest rate as their domestic operating target, we
will use the second definition of sterilization. At first sight both definitions seem almost
identical, but in the situation of shocks to the domestic money market, the two control options
lead to very different results (Bofinger 2001).
                                                
5 The lagged values of ∆ NDA were included to capture other effects than the sterilization policy of the central
banks. The data is monthly and all taken from the IFS (lines 11 to 17).25
Many economists are in doubt whether sterilized intervention can have a direct effect on the
exchange rate since with such interventions the relative domestic money supplies remain
constant. For instance Rosenberg argues:
“According to the monetary approach to exchange rate determination, central bank
intervention that does not alter the supply of money relative to the demand for money will not
have a perceptible impact on exchange rates.” (Rosenberg 1996, p. 298)
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For an understanding of sterilized intervention it is necessary to describe in more detail the
transactions and their impact on the balance sheets of the central bank, commercial banks and
non-bank investors. We start with a situation where a euro area commercial bank (CB￿) holds
100 ￿ reserves with ECB which it has obtained via a repo credit. At the same time a euro area
investor (IN￿) holds a 100 $ deposit with a United States commercial bank (CB$). We neglect
from minimum reserves and assume that the dollar/euro exchange rate is 1:1.
1
st round (intervention):
We now assume that the investor wants to exchange his dollar deposit into a euro deposit. For
this purpose he sells the deposit to CB￿ which in turn sells it on the foreign exchange market.
We assume that the ECB intervenes and purchases the dollar deposit from CB￿. The counter-




The ECB sterilizes the intervention by reducing its repo credits to CB￿.
As a result, the monetary base in the euro area and in the United States (which we do not need to
present) has remained unchanged. The foreign deposits with CB$ have also not changed, but the
ECB has become a depositor instead of IN￿. Thus, the dollar deposits held by non-central banks
have declined. At the same time, the euro deposits held by non-banks with the CB￿ have
increased. In other words: even with constant monetary base in both areas, the relative amount of
deposits held by the public have changed. This has been compensated by the ECB which holds
more dollar assets and less euro assets since it has reduced its euro denominated repo credits.
                                                
6 See also Samo and Taylor (2001, p. 6)26
Thus, with sterilized interventions a central bank enters an open position the foreign currency – a
long position if it purchases foreign exchange, a short position if it sells foreign exchange.
Seen from this perspective sterilized intervention implies a certain commitment by a central bank
since in both cases the risk of the open position is at least partially determined by the central
bank’s own actions. In the case of an appreciating currency, the central bank runs the risk that
the domestic value of its foreign exchange reserves is reduced by an appreciation of the domestic
currency which the central bank is able to prevent. In the case of a depreciating currency the
opposite applies but the budget constraint of foreign exchange reserves makes the commitment
less binding.
As these portfolio adjustments are the driving force of sterilized interventions, the literature
obviously suffers from an incorrect identification of the relative monetary bases with the relative
amount of deposits held by the public in the two currencies.
A very common assumption in this regard is the assumption of a perfect substitutability between
assets denominated in different currencies. In the words of Samo and Taylor (2001, p. 27):
“(...) it is tempting to conjecture that the portfolio balance channel will diminish in
importance over time – at least among the major industrial countries – as international capital
markets become increasingly integrated and the degree of substitutability between financial
assets denominated in the major currencies increases.”
While this seems plausible for risk-neutral investors, it does not hold if investors are risk-averse.
The very fact that investors incur transactions for exchanging a dollar deposit into a euro deposit
indicates that the two assets are not regarded as perfect substitutes. With a perfect substitutability
of dollar and euro assets it would be also difficult to explain the huge trading volume on foreign
exchange markets. Why should banks trade assets of about 2 billion dollar per day if they are
complete substitutes? In other words, increasing capital mobility does not mean that the assets
traded are substitutes. On contrary, large capital flows are an indication that investors see
important qualitative differences in assets that are denominated in different currencies or issued
by debtors from different regions.27
4.1.3  How can the costs of sterilization be avoided
Thus, we have shown that a central bank is always able to avoid an unwarranted appreciation of
its currency without losing control over the domestic interest rate. The remaining problem are the
costs of sterilization (
S
t C ). These costs that are supposed to occur in period t (defined per unit of
domestic currency that is supplied in interventions in period t-1) are made up of two
components: the interest rate costs (or earnings) (
i
t C ) and the valuation losses (or returns) from
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The interest rate component of sterilization is determined by the difference between the foreign
and the domestic interest rate:
(10) 
*
1 t 1 t
i
t i i C − − − = .
This is due to the fact that a sterilized intervention that tries to prevent an appreciation leads to
an increase in foreign assets and a decrease in domestic assets; in the case of a deposit facility or
the issuance of notes, domestic liabilities increase. Thus, the central bank loses income from
domestic assets (or has to pay interest on domestic liabilities) while it receives additional income
from an higher amount of foreign assets. It is obvious that sterilized interventions are associated
with interest costs (returns) if the domestic interest rate is higher (lower) than the foreign interest
rate.
The valuation costs (returns) per unit of sterilization depend on the percentage change of the
exchange rate which we express by the difference of the log of the nominal exchange rate:
(11)  () t 1 t t
V
t s s s C ∆ − = − − = − .
If the domestic currency depreciates, the value of foreign exchange reserves in terms of the
domestic currency increases. The central bank makes a profit from sterilized intervention.
Both cost components can be combined in order to define conditions under which sterilized
interventions are free of charge:
(12)  () 1 t t
*
1 t 1 t
!
S
t s s i i 0 C − − − − − − = = ,
which leads to the ex post formulation of the interest parity condition:28
(13)  ()
*
1 t 1 t 1 t t i i s s − − − − = − .
In other words, the costs of sterilized intervention are zero if a central bank targets the exchange
rate in a way that it follows a path that is determined by the interest rate differential. This
guarantees at the same time that there are no profit opportunities for short-term oriented
investors which invest in the domestic currency. If the domestic interest rate is higher than the
foreign interest rate this advantage is fully compensated by a depreciation of the domestic
currency. Thus the condition of zero costs for sterilized interventions is the mirror image of the
condition that the mix of exchange rate and interest policy should not provide profit
opportunities for short-term oriented investors. In fact, the profits of these investors are to a large
extent nothing else but the sterilization costs paid by the central bank.
7
4.1.4  Scope and limits of exchange rate targeting
In sum, the exchange rate can targeted by the central bank without a budget constraint, without
costs and without negative side effects on interest rate policy, if
•   the domestic currency is appreciating vis-à-vis the foreign currency,
•   its sterilization potential is unlimited, which can be arranged by offering a deposit
facility,
•   the targeted exchange rate path is compatible with the prevailing interest rate differential.
A control over the exchange rate is more difficult, if a central banks tries to counteract a
depreciation and/or if it follows exchange rate paths that are associated with high sterilization
costs e.g. if the domestic currency is kept stable although the domestic interest exceeds the
foreign interest rate. The limits of exchange rate targeting are reached in a situation with strong
capital outflows that can occur even though the targeted exchange rate is compatible with the
prevailing interest rate differential. This can happen if the expected depreciation of the domestic
currency exceeds the depreciation that is targeted by the domestic central bank. When the foreign
exchange reserves are exhausted, a central bank has to abandon its targeted exchange rate path.
We will further discuss this issue in Chapter 4.2.2.
                                                
7 As far as domestic commercial banks receive deposits denominated in the domestic currency and grant credits in
the foreign currency, they also pay for the profits of short-term oriented investors.29
4.2  Internal and external equilibrium under exchange rate targeting
We have shown that a central bank is to a certain degree able to control the exchange rate
together with domestic interest rate. The interesting question for a normative theory of managed
floating is how to combine these two operating targets of monetary policy. A useful starting
point is the logic of the Mundell-Fleming model. It is designed for identifying combinations of
fiscal policy, monetary policy, and exchange rate policy
8 that allow the simultaneous
achievement of internal and external equilibrium. Internal equilibrium is defined as an output
level that implies full employment. External equilibrium is defined as a situation where the
central bank’s foreign exchange reserves remain constant. In the Mundell-Fleming model, capital
mobility implies that the domestic interest rate equals the foreign interest rate. In other words,
external equilibrium is reached if the domestic interest rate policy is compatible with UIP since
the expected exchange rate change E[∆ st] equals by assumption always zero.
For a theory of managed floating this basic logic can be also applied. In other words, the policy
instruments have to be set in order to allow a simultaneous achievement of internal and external
equilibrium. The main difference to the Mundell-Fleming model is that in the latter there are
three policy instruments: the exchange rate, the interest rate, and fiscal policy. While it may be
interesting to develop a model to includes all three instruments, for the sake of simplicity it is
useful to discuss a model that deals with the interest rate and the exchange rate only. Thus, we
will show how the exchange rate and the interest rate have to be targeted in order to achieve both
equilibria. In this sense, our model is limited to monetary policy aspects, and accordingly the
strategy of managed floating has to be interpreted as a comprehensive monetary policy strategy
within the two extreme cases of absolutely fixed and independently floating exchange rates.
4.2.1  Internal equilibrium
In order to derive the internal equilibrium condition, we start with the transmission channels of
monetary impulses in a small open economy. For the conduct of monetary policy it is important
to differentiate between two channels: the exchange rate channel and the interest rate channel
(see Svensson 2000).
                                                
8 Remember that the Mundell-Fleming model only captures the two polar cases of either completely fixed or
independently floating exchange rates (see Chapter 3.1).30
With the interest rate channel, monetary policy affects aggregate demand via its effect on the
short-term real interest rate (and possibly on the availability of credit). Subsequently, aggregate
demand affects inflation via the supply-side of an economy which is often described by a
Phillips-curve relation. In this respect we follow the current mainstream in monetary
macroeconomics according to which the money stock only plays a minor role in describing
monetary policy effects (see Romer 2000 for an illustrative paper). Monetary policy is thus
assumed to follow an interest rate policy rather than a money supply policy. We will come back
to this issue at the end of this Chapter.
The exchange rate channel can be divided into a direct and an indirect channel. The direct
channel explains inflation fluctuations via the pass-through of exchange rate fluctuations to
import prices. The inflation rate of a small open economy  t π  (measured by consumer price
inflation) with a share of imported goods ω  is a weighted sum of domestic inflation 
d
t π  and







t t 1 ωπ + π ω − = π .
The foreign inflation 
*
t π  is assumed to be transmitted to domestic inflation via changes of the
exchange rate  t s ∆ :
(15)  t
* f
t s ∆ + π = π .
Inserting equation (15) into equation (14) finally describes the direct exchange rate channel in a
simple way:
(16)  () ( ) t
* d
t t s 1 ∆ + π ω + π ω − = π .
Indirectly, a change in the real exchange rate affects the relative price between domestic and
foreign goods, which in turn has an impact on both, domestic and foreign demand for domestic
goods, and hence contributes to the aggregate demand channel for the transmission of monetary
policy. From standard macroeconomics we know that the national income Yt can be separated
into consumption C, investment I, government purchases G, and net exports NX:
(17)  ()( ) ( )
*
t t t t t t t Y , Y , Q NX G r , Y I Y C Y + + + = .31
The inclusion of net exports extends a closed economy analysis (where central monetary policy
variable is the real interest rate rt which determines planned investment) to the open economy.









where St is the nominal exchange rate and  t
*
t P P  is the price of foreign (import) goods in
relation to (home) export goods. Standard textbooks in monetary economics now reduce the
definition of aggregate demand to the relevant variables rt and Qt. It is common to adopt a
relationship that is linear in these two variables. We therefore solve our aggregate demand
equation for output and write it in logarithms (except for the real interest rate). This finally yields
the following open economy IS function:
(19) 
D
t t 2 t 1 0 t q r y ε + δ + δ − δ = .
yt is the log of output, qt the log of the real exchange rate, and 
D
t ε  a random white noise
disturbance (demand shock) which captures shocks in domestic government spending, domestic
saving and investment behavior, and foreign income. The parameter δ 0 incorporates all
autonomous components of aggregate demand. δ 1 is the interest rate elasticity of aggregate
demand, and δ 2 the exchange rate elasticity. All three parameters are assumed to be positive.
Although most often introduced that way, for our purposes the IS equation (19) suffers from its
inability to capture the effects of exchange rate changes which is central for a theory of managed
floating. For this reason we modified the IS function as follows. Due to the flow character of
aggregate demand, the time subscript t refers to a period of time, say a quarter of a year. Thus,
for quantifying how much aggregate demand is affected by the real exchange rate, it is important
to take into account
•   the percentage change of the real exchange rate ∆ qt from the beginning of the period to
its end, and
•   the average level of the real exchange rate qt during that period.
Accordingly, a modified description of the IS function in an open economy is given by
                                                





t t 3 t 2 t 1 0 t q q r y ε + δ + ∆ δ + δ − δ = .
In a next step, to get an expression for the output gap  t y ~ , we subtract the natural rate of output  y ˆ
from both sides of equation (20):
(21) 
D
t t 3 t 2 t 1 0 t t y ˆ q q r y ˆ y y ~ ε + − δ + ∆ δ + δ − δ = − = .
This allows us to eliminate the “neutral” components of aggregate demand, i.e. those which are
determined by (long-run) factors other than monetary policy ones:
(22)  q ˆ r ˆ y ˆ 3 1 0 δ + δ − δ = ,
where  r ˆ denotes the neutral real short-term interest rate and q ˆ  is the log of the neutral real
exchange rate. Thus, the output gap in equation (21) can be written as
(23)  () ( )
D
t t 3 t 2 t 1 t q ˆ q q r ˆ r y ~ ε + − δ + ∆ δ + − δ − = .
For the sake of simplicity, we now normalize r ˆ to zero. q ˆ  is assumed to adopt the value of qt so
that we arrive at the final definition of the output gap:
(24) 
D
t t 2 t 1 t q r y ~ ε + ∆ δ + δ − = .
The reason for the different treatment of the neutral values will be explained in the next
paragraph.
4.2.1.1  Measuring the actual monetary policy stance: the concept of the actual MCI (MCIt)
If one aims at concentrating on the demand-side effects of monetary policy (interest rate channel
and exchange rate channel), a comprehensive measure of the actual policy stance of the central
bank’s two operating targets is provided by the so-called Monetary Conditions Index (MCI)
which can be defined in a simple form as follows:
(25)  MCIt = δ 1rt - δ 2∆ qt.
If the monetary policy stance is about to tighten, the MCI rises, and in the opposite case, the
index falls. With positive elasticities δ 2 and δ 2, a tighter MCI can be achieved by raising the33
interest rate, by a real appreciation, or by a combination of both.
10 In particular, we refer to this
MCI as to the “actual” MCIt (with the subscript t) as it perfectly reflects the actual monetary
policy stance. In contrast to the MCI that Ball (1999b) uses in his paper (see also Chapter 3.2)
our index is a linear combination of the real short-term interest rate rt and the change of the real
exchange rate ∆ qt. The reasoning behind this modification can be explained as follows:
•   First, as already pointed out by McCallum (1999) who defined the MCI in a similar way,
it can be argued that, in order to get a “dimensionally coherent definition” of the MCI,
the level of the real exchange rate qt is not an adequate measure as it does not refer to a
period of time (like interest rates do). This point becomes even more obvious when the
real variables are transformed into their nominal counterparts. For the level of the real
exchange rate it suffices to know the actual price level (see equation (18)), whereas the
change in the real exchange rate has to be transformed into ∆ st via the inflation rate,
similar to what the Fisher equation postulates for interest rates (see equations (45) and
(46) in Chapter 4.3).
•   Second, various econometric studies show that qt and rt are of different orders of
integration. While rt is a stationary variable, qt is generally found to be integrated of order
one. Here again, coherence is required to avoid undesirable properties of the MCI (see
Eika et al. 1996, p. 784 who emphasize this point). Thus, the first difference of the real
exchange rate variable seems to be a more suitable measure of the exchange rate channel.
Of course this formulation of the MCI neglects the fact that, for example, an already overvalued
real exchange rate still has effects on aggregate demand even though it remains unchanged.
Hence, by setting q ˆ  equal to qt, we always assume that our monetary policy analysis starts in a
situation where the real exchange rate is on its neutral level. As a compromise the empirical
literature on aggregate demand in small open economies often uses a relatively long ∆  with up to
eight quarters. The coefficients δ 1 and δ 2 are equal to the estimated effects of these two financial
variables on aggregate demand, and hence, on inflation (for a comprehensive overview of the use
of MCIs see Mayes and Virén 2000). The MCI is thus conditional on the structural
characteristics and on the underlying model of the economy.
                                                
10 Note that a negative change in the real exchange rate is a real appreciation. Of course central banks are only able
to directly control the nominal values of their operating targets it and ∆ st. But under the important assumption of
price stickiness, rt and ∆ qt are perfectly correlated with their nominal counterparts it and ∆ st, the operating targets
of the central bank. We will further discuss this issue in Chapter 4.3.34
4.2.1.2  Deriving the optimal monetary policy stance: the concept of the optimal MCI (MCIt
opt)
For the monetary policy maker it is now crucial to know which actual MCI (MCIt) he has to
realize. The purpose of this Chapter is to derive the optimal monetary policy stance. We asume a
model of a small open economy similar to the one applied by Gerlach and Smets (2000) where
the so-called optimal MCI (
opt
t MCI ) is the result of the minimization procedure of an
intertemporal loss function. The behavior of the private sector is described with two equations:
(26)  ()
S
t t 1 t t t p E p y ~ ε + − β = −
(27) 
D
t t 2 t 1 t q r y ~ ε + ∆ δ + δ − = .
Equation (26) is a simple Phillips curve relation for the supply side with a random white noise
disturbance 
S
t ε  (supply shocks).  t y ~  denotes the output gap and the term in brackets is the
deviation of the actual price level from the expected price level. Equation (27) describes the
demand side of an economy with a traditional IS relation. 
D
t ε  is again a random white noise
disturbance (demand shock). Equating (26) and (27) and solving for a linear combination of rt
and ∆ qt defines an expression for the real MCI as introduced in equation (25):




t t t 2 t 1 p E p MCI q r − − β − ε − ε = = ∆ δ − δ .
To simplify things, we divide equation (28) by δ 1 and we replace δ 2/δ 1 by δ :
11




t 1 t t t p E p 1 MCI q r − − δ β − ε − ε δ = = ∆ δ − .
The optimal MCI is then generated through the minimization of a central bank’s loss function
which is given by




t t 1 t y ~ L π − π χ + ε − χ = .
π
T is the inflation target set by the central bank. χ 1 and χ 2 denote the relative weights assigned to
output deviations from equilibrium and inflation deviations from target. With the first-order
condition of equation (30) and a few assumptions (full information and rational expectations)
Gerlach and Smets derive the following expression for the price forecast error35




t 1 t t E p E p π − π γ = − − − ,
where ( ) 2
2
1 2 χ + β χ χ = γ .
12 Inserting equation (31) into equation (29) finally yields the optimal
MCI:










t E 1 MCI π − π δ βγ − ε − ε δ = − .
According to equation (32) the optimal MCI changes due to changes of the parameters on the
right-hand side of the equation. Accordingly, if the optimal MCI shall be exogenous to the




T = π − π − . Thus, the optimal MCI depends solely on real shocks affecting the economy.
4.2.1.3  The internal equilibrium rule
The internal equilibrium condition can finally be described as follows:












t t t E 1 MCI MCI q r π − π δ βγ − ε − ε δ = = = ∆ δ − −
In other words, the MCI serves as combined measure of the monetary policy stance which has to
be controlled and adjusted in response to changing macroeconomic conditions. As a simple rule
the actual MCI shall rise (the monetary policy stance becomes more restrictive) if the domestic
economy is affected by excess demand shocks (the optimal MCI rises); in the opposite case,
when the domestic economy signalizes deflationary pressures (the optimal MCI declines), the
actual MCI shall decline (the monetary policy stance becomes more expansionary). The
domestic constraint to monetary policy therefore is the strict observation of this rule,
independently of the exchange rate regime chosen. A deviation from this rule leads to either an
overheating or a recession of the domestic economy.
The idea behind such a rule is similar to the well-known and widely accepted monetary policy
rules for closed economies. This type of rules is mostly formulated in terms of a short-term (real
or nominal) interest rate. A common feature is that the optimal interest rate policy of a central
bank responds positively to output gaps and deviations of the inflation rate from its target value
(for a theoretical derivation see Ball 1999a and Svensson 1997; for an empirical application see
                                                                                                                                                            
11 Note that the MCI in equation (29) formally differs from that in equation (28) (by a factor δ 1). But as the MCI is
an index, its information content is resistant to linear transformations. We therefore hold on using the expression
“MCIt” and keep in mind that from now on we refer to the definition in equation (29).36
Clarida et al. 1998). For our purpose, it is sufficient to reduce the rule to a linear equation which
is given, in a general form, as follows:




t y ~ b a r ˆ y ~ , f r + π − π + = π = ,
where  r ˆ represents the equilibrium (or neutral) real interest rate, and the coefficients a and b
incorporate structural parameters of the economy as well as the monetary policy maker’s weights
χ 1 and χ 2 (see equation (30)).
13 Transforming our open economy rule of equation (33) into a rule
similar to the closed economy formulation of equation (34) yields




t y ~ b a I C ˆ M y ~ , f MCI + π − π + = π = .
Such a transformation is allowed as long as one assumes that the real shocks 
D
t ε  and 
S
t ε  of
equation (33) are reflected in output gaps unequal zero and/or deviations of the inflation rate
from its target value. As the MCI is simply an index, the neutral level  I C ˆ M can be set to zero.
The major difference to a closed economy rule is thus the extension of the central bank’s
instruments by interventions in the foreign exchange market, and consequently, the consideration
of a double-operating-target framework.
4.2.2  External equilibrium
For the discussion of the external equilibrium in an open economy we assume free capital
mobility. This assumption can be justified with the very weak evidence for the effectiveness of
capital controls (see Ariyoshi et al. 2000) and with the high allocative and administrative costs of
a comprehensive system of capital controls. As already mentioned, in such a world of free capital
mobility the external equilibrium is characterized by an equilibrium in the balance of payments
which means that the current account is fully financed by the capital account so that the foreign
exchange reserves of the central bank remain constant. That is to say, foreign exchange market
interventions by the central bank do not occur. In the following we will derive the condition
under which this equilibrium holds. We will further see that each time when deviations take
place there is a case for foreign exchange market interventions of the central bank. For this
                                                                                                                                                            
12 See Appendix 4: Derivation of the optimal MCI based on the minimization of a central bank’s loss function.
13 The most famous type of this kind of rules is the Taylor rule where the coefficients a and b are supposed to be
equal to 0.5.37
purpose it is important to take a deeper look at the behavior of the two major participants of the
foreign exchange market: the private investors and the domestic central bank.
14
4.2.2.1  The private investor’s external equilibrium
The private sector’s equilibrium condition is captured by the well-known uncovered interest
parity:
(36)  it = 
*
t i +  E [ ∆ st] + t α .
According to UIP, in equilibrium the return on domestic investment it equals the expected return
on foreign investment which itself is the sum of the foreign interest rate 
*
t i , the expected
exchange rate change E[∆ st] and, depending on the underlying monetary and exchange rate
regime, a time-varying risk premium  t α . If this condition is met, private market participants
should be indifferent between the domestic and the risky foreign investment. Hence, short-term
15
capital flows do not occur.
4.2.2.2  The central bank’s external equilibrium
The equivalent of the private investor’s arbitrage condition is the central bank’s zero-cost-
condition. In Chapter 4.1 we explained the mechanics of sterilized foreign exchange market
interventions. One basic result was that if central banks want to make independent and efficient
use of the short-term interest rate and the exchange rate as operating target, the costs of
sterilization have to be zero. This led to the ex post interest parity condition which we formulated






t t s i i ∆ = − .
                                                
14 We will see later on that the foreign central bank also has an important impact on our equilibrium conditions,
mainly by setting the foreign short-term interest rate 
*
t i . But as this will be treated as being exogenous to the
domestic central bank’s policy decision, it is sufficient to concentrate on these two participants.
15 In our context the short term refers to a period of one or at most three months which corresponds to the maturity
of the interest rates that is normally assumed to be under the control of the central bank.38
According to equation (37) the central bank targets an exchange rate path (
T
t s ∆ ) that is equal to
the difference of the domestic interest rate it (set by the central bank as well) and the exogenous
foreign interest rate 
*
t i.
4.2.2.3  The overall external equilibrium and the central bank’s intervention response function
The overall equilibrium condition can be obtained by inserting equation (36) into equation (37):
(38)  [] t t
T
t s E s α + ∆ = ∆ .
That is to say, if the central bank’s targeted exchange rate path equals the private sector’s
expected exchange rate change plus the actual risk premium, then there is no need for the central
bank to intervene in the foreign exchange market, and the balance of payments is in equilibrium
as defined in the introduction of Chapter 4.2.2.
Otherwise, there is a case for central bank interventions. Two basically different situations have
to be distinguished:
In the first case, private investors expect to make a surplus through an investment in the domestic
economy which leads to capital inflows. The sum of the private sector’s expectations about the
future exchange rate path and the required risk premium are more than compensated by the given
actual interest differential and the given actual spot rate:




t t s E s i i α + ∆ > ∆ = − .
The central bank now intervenes in the foreign exchange market in order to absorb the excess
supply of foreign exchange. This guarantees that the central bank achieves the desired exchange
rate path 
T
t s ∆ . At the same time, it is able to keep the interest rate at its level it because of the
immediate sterilization of the accumulated foreign reserves. It is important to underline that in
this case the central bank is neither restrained by its stock of foreign reserves (the bank is able to
buy unlimited amounts of foreign reserves) nor by any costs of sterilization (by achieving 
T
t s ∆ ,
the bank perfectly fulfills the zero-cost-condition).
The second case is characterized by capital outflows which can be described as follows:




t t s E s i i α + ∆ < ∆ = − .39
The actual interest rate differential does not compensate for the expected exchange rate change
and the required risk premium, and hence, international investors prefer the foreign investment.
As the central bank’s objective is to realize 
T
t s ∆ , it has to sell foreign assets in order to satisfy
the excess demand for foreign exchange. Here again, the sterilization issue is not a problem as
long as the desired exchange rate path is achieved. But in contrast to the first case (the capital
inflow case), now the central bank is restrained by its stock of foreign reserves. In Chapter 4.1.1
we labelled this the hard budget constraint. But this does not mean that the central bank is not
able to realize 
T
t s ∆  at all. As long as its reserves exceed a critical threshold, say NFA
c, the
central bank can credibly achieve the desired path through sterilized interventions. But as soon as
the current stock of foreign reserves is perceived as too low by the international investors, capital
outflows will accelerate and the central bank looses its intervention instrument.
In sum, sterilized foreign exchange market interventions can be described by the following
implicit function:
(41)  [] ( ) t t
T
t t t s E s f NFA I α − ∆ − ∆ = ∆ = ,
where f(0) is equal to zero and where the first derivative f’ is always positive. Theoretically, It
can adopt values ranging from –NFA
c to infinity. Thus, equation (41) completes our flow
channel analysis of foreign exchange market interventions in Chapter 4.1.1.
In most of the cases described above (the capital inflow case, the case without interventions, and






t t s i i ∆ = − .
We call this the “control situation”. There is only one case in which the central bank looses the
control over its operationg target: the capital outflow case with foreign reserves falling below a
critical threshold. In this situation which we call “out-of-control situation”, the central bank is no
longer able to target the exchange rate through sterilized interventions. It rather has to adjust its
interest rates in order to stop the capital outflow. This adjustment can be achieved by either
reducing the domestic part of the monetary base, or by non-sterilized foreign exchange market
interventions which lowers the foreign part of the monetary base. Independently of how40
domestic interest rates are raised, the external equilibrium condition in the out-of-control
situation becomes
(43)  it = 
*
t i +  E [ ∆ st] + t α .
We will further discuss the consequences of this situation for the overall monetary policy
strategy of managed floating in the end of the next Chapter. Figure 6 summarizes again the major
relationships underlying the external equilibrium of our strategy.
Figure 6: The external equilibrium
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4.3  A monetary policy framework for small open economies
In the following we develop a simple policy framework for managed floating which is based on
the dual requirement of internal and external equilibrium. Its main structure is presented in
Figure 7. It shows the instruments, the operating targets and the final targets of monetary policy.
While the external equilibrium is by itself not a final target of monetary policy, one can assume
that a violation of this condition will lead to a currency crisis and thus to output losses in the
future.41
Figure 7: Monetary policy in small open economies
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Our framework is a typical example for the analysis of economic policy by Tinbergen (1952)
who has shown that in order to meet two independent targets two instruments are required that
need to be efficient and independent from each other.
This framework can now be analyzed with a very simple set of equations: The two equations for
external and internal equilibrium have to be solved for the two policy variables: the nominal
interest rate and the target path for the nominal exchange rate. For reasons of simplicity we omit
the T superscript for the exchange rate target since for the interest rate target this is also not the
common practice. Moreover, for the moment, we only analyze situations where the exchange
rate path and the interest rate are under perfect control of the central bank. The other case, when
the central bank runs out of foreign reserves, is discussed in detail in the end of this Chapter.
Internal equilibrium is defined by a combination of the two operating targets that generate the
optimum MCI which has been derived as mentioned above:
(44)  t t
opt
t q r MCI ∆ δ − = .42




t t t 1 t t s q q q π − π + ∆ = − = ∆ +
and the Fisher equation






t i r π − =
we can show how the two operating targets have to be set in order to generate the optimum MCI:
(47)  () ( ) t
*
t t t t
opt
t s i MCI π − π + ∆ δ + π − = .




t t t 1 t t i i s s s − = − = ∆ + .
All variables in these two equations with the exception of the two operating targets (it and ∆ st)
are either exogenous or predetermined. For the framework of managed floating which applies







t r , , i π ). The same applies to the structural parameter of the domestic
economy (δ ) –at least in the short-run. We assume that in the short-run π t is predetermined
because of price rigidities. Finally, at the level of operating targets the optimum MCI which has
been derived according to equations (32) and (35) can also be regarded as an exogenous variable.
Within the limits discussed in the previous Chapter the instrument variables of monetary policy
(it and ∆ st) are directly controllable by the central bank. With equations (45) and (46) and the
assumption of short-term price rigidities, we can also consider their real counterparts rt and ∆ qt
as instruments.
The model which consists of the two equations for internal and external equilibrium can now be
solved for the optimum values of the two operating targets. This can be obtained by inserting
equations (45), (46) and (48) into equation (44) which yields the optimum MCI that is





t r 1 i 1 MCI δ + π δ − − δ − = .43
From this we can calculate the optimum interest rate:




t t r MCI
1
1
i π + δ −
δ −
= .
Inserting equation (50) into equation (48) and solving for ∆ st yields an MCI dependent







t t r MCI
1
1
s π − π + −
δ −
= ∆ .
Thus, our model provides two simple rules for the choice of the operating targets under a system
of managed floating. It shows that the two domestic policy variables are determined by
•   the required degree of monetary policy restraint according to 
opt
t MCI ,
•   the real interest rate in the anchor currency country (or in the basket currency countries),
•   the domestic inflation rate, and
•   the structural parameters of the economy.
The target path for the exchange rate is additionally dependent on the foreign inflation rate (or
the inflation differential) vis-à-vis the anchor country. The two equations show that the sign with
which the optimum MCI and the foreign real interest rate influence the two operating targets
depends on the value of the structural parameters δ . Its concrete value depends on the relative
weight of the interest rate and the exchange rate channel in an open economy. Empirical
estimates show that in most cases δ 1 exceeds δ 2 (thus δ <1) while the opposite holds only for very
small economies (δ >1) (see Mayes and Virén 2000 and the literature cited there). Thus, for the
standard cases,
•   the nominal interest rate has to be increased with the optimum MCI, the domestic
inflation rate, and reduced with the foreign real interest rate;
•   the nominal exchange rate has to be depreciated (∆ st>0) with the optimum MCI, the
domestic inflation rate, and appreciated (∆ st<0) with the foreign real interest rate and the
foreign inflation rate.
The latter is the most important result of this simple model. It shows that the optimum exchange
rate strategy is a policy where the exchange target path is determined on a ongoing basis44
depending on the domestic and foreign determinants of equation (51). In other words, managed
floating as a strategy where the central bank targets the exchange rate along a non-announced
and adjustable path is exactly the optimum approach that is required to achieve internal and
external equilibrium in a world of capital mobility.



























This shows that the effect of a change of the foreign real interest rate depends on the size of the
structural parameter δ . If δ <1, which seems to be the case for most countries, a decline of the
foreign real interest rate requires a change in the policy with a higher domestic interest rate and a
stronger targeted depreciation of the domestic currency. For instance, in the case of the strong
reduction in the dollar real interest rate in 1992/1993 the Asian countries should have reacted
with a higher targeted depreciation of the currencies (which would have implied that the de facto
fixed pegs had to be abandoned) while raising the domestic interest rate. This change in the
policy mix would have allowed them to maintain a constant optimum MCI.
The optimum monetary policy response is more difficult to implement in the case of a more than
temporary increase of the foreign real interest rate. In order to maintain a given MCI, this would
require a shift to lower interest rates and to an appreciation or a reduced depreciation of the
domestic currency. But this policy response is limited by the central bank’s stock of foreign
reserves. Thus, it could additionally increase the risk premium which accelerates the capital
outflow (see equation (41)). In other words, a country could be forced to accept a policy mix that
stops the capital outflow and that restores external equilibrium by increasing the domestic
interest rates. In the preceding Chapter we called this an out-of-control situation.
To illustrate the overall macroeconomic consequences of such a situation, let us first recall the





t r r 1 MCI δ + δ − = .45
The optimal interest rate rt, and thus the optimal nominal interest rate it = rt + π t strictly fulfills





t t s i i ∆ + = .
The out-of-control situation was characterized by the following external equilibrium condition:




t s E i i α + ∆ + = ,
where 
out
t i  typically exceeds the optimal it in order to stop the ongoing capital outflow. The








t r r 1 MCI δ + δ − = .
We can now compare the out-of-control situation with the optimal situation by simply
subtracting equation (54) from equation (57):








t r r 1 MCI MCI − δ − = − .




t < δ > − , the out-of-control situation leads to
an overly restrictive MCI.
4.4  The advantages of managed floating in comparison with traditional exchange rate
strategies
The advantages of managed floating can be demonstrated if we use our model for an analysis of
traditional exchange rate strategies: fixed nominal exchange rates, an active and a passive crawl
and pure floating.
We proceed as follows. We assume that a country always tries to maintain external equilibrium.
Thus, for each exchange rate strategy we use the UIP equation and calculate the required
domestic interest rate. With this rate and the exchange rate target defined by the exchange rate
strategy we can calculate an actual MCI. It obvious that the actual MCI in this context is not
necessarily identical with the optimum MCI that we have used so far. Finally this exercise allows
us to identify the main determinants of the actual MCI under different exchange rate regimes and
to show why “no single currency regime is right for all countries and at all times” (Frankel 1999)
– except for managed floating.46
4.4.1  Absolutely fixed exchange rates
For absolutely fixed exchange rates, the policy rule for the exchange rate is:
(59)  0 s or s s t t 1 t = ∆ = + .
The interest rate rule is obtained by using the UIP condition of equation (36). In a typical fixed
rate system there is no room for sterilized interventions, and thus, the central bank’s external
equilibrium is subordinated to the private sector’s equilibrium condition. Inserting equation (59)





t t t r i π + + α = .
The two instrument rules given in equations(59) and (60) finally yield the actual MCI:






t r 1 MCI + α + π − π δ − = .
This shows that under a system of fixed exchange rates the actual MCI is entirely determined by
factors that are exogenous to the monetary authorities: the actual inflation differential, the risk
premium, and the foreign real interest rate. Of course, this policy mix does not guarantee that the
central bank achieves the optimal MCI which is irrespective of the currency regime chosen. A
general expression was derived in Chapter 4.2.1 as follows:




t y ~ b a MCI + π − π = .
By subtracting equation (62) from equation (61) we can now analyze situations in which the
MCI of a fixed rate regime corresponds to the optimal MCI:












t = − π − π − + α + π − π δ − = − .
For our calculation of the MCI we have assumed that the anchor currency central bank sets its
nominal interest rate according to the Fisher equation. In reality however, the nominal interest
rate can be higher or lower depending on the cyclical situation in the anchor country. If we
assume that the anchor country follows a real interest rate rule for a relatively closed economy
(see equation (34) with r ˆ set to zero for simplicity
17), equation (63) becomes:
                                                                                                                                                            
16 We assume that the expected exchange rate change E[∆ st] yields a real exchange rate change ∆ qt.
17 This simplification is analogous to the simplification that the “neutral”  I C ˆ M  is zero (see equation (35)).47
















t = − π − π − + π − π + α + π − π δ − = − ,
where 
T * π  is the inflation target of the anchor currency and 
*
t y ~  is the log of its output gap. Based
on this condition, we can now examine two situations where the fixed exchange rate strategy
seems to be an optimal strategy in the sense of our optimality condition presented in Chapter 4.2.
A first case can often be observed in countries that are in the early stages of a stabilization
program. As the inflation differential to the anchor country is high, the cyclical components of
equation (64) (the terms that are proceeded by a*, b*, a or b) are of minor importance.
Accordingly, a strategy of fixed exchange rates can be applied
•   if δ  exceeds 1,
•   as long as there is a high risk premium.
The condition of δ >1 is only met in the case of very open and/or little monetizised economies.
Table 7 presents the degree of openness and the monetization of several countries that adopted a
fixed exchange rate regime in recent years. It is important to note, however, that equation (64)
also prescribes that an exit strategy is needed as soon as the risk premium declines faster than the
inflation differential.
Table 7: Structural characteristics of fixed exchange rate regimes
Date of introduction Inflation rate in the
year of introduction
Degree of openness Monetization
Currency Boards
Argentina 03/91 172% 5% 11%
Estonia 06/92 1076% 41% 30%
Lithuania 04/94 72% 52% 26%
Bulgaria 07/97 1082% 48% 34%
Fixers
Czech Republic 12/90 57% (91) 42% (93) 70% (93)
Mexico 11/91 23% 10% 25%
Euro area 13% (99) 70% (99)
Sources: IFS, EBRD (1999)
The second case can best be illustrated by the successful exchange rate policy of the Netherlands
and Austria in the 1980s and the 1990s which maintained a fixed exchange rate vis-à-vis the D-
mark and which had similarly low inflation rates as Germany. Accordingly we assume that the48
anchor country and the small open economy have similar inflation targets (
T T * π = π ). Moreover,
the parameters a and b are also assumed to be similar in both countries. This finally reduces
equation (64) to










t = α + − + π − π + δ − = − .
Under these assumptions fixed exchange rates seem to be the optimal strategy if
•   there is no inflation differential,
•   the countries have the same output gap,
•   there is no risk premium.
The first two conditions are perfectly met if the countries have relatively similar economic cycles
and if they are subject to the same real disturbances. In this respect Austria and the Netherlands
with their strong economic ties with Germany are good examples for a successful fixed peg.
However, if one of these conditions is violated, then countries have a real incentive to deviate
from the rules prescribed by our monetary policy framework. In the Appendix (Appendix 5: A
simple framework for the explanation of currency crises) we show that our model is able to
capture these macroeconomic reasons that led to the outbreak of currency crises.
4.4.2  Crawling pegs
A crawling peg system is characterized by the fact that the path of the exchange rate is
determined by a formula that in most cases includes the domestic and the foreign inflation rate.
In the case of an active crawl the exchange rate path is determined by the difference between a
target value for the domestic inflation rate (π
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Here again, the interest rate rule is the strict observance of the private sector’s external
equilibrium condition. A crawling peg where the future exchange rate path is typically49
preannounced is therefore under this respect quite similar to a fixed rate strategy. For an active
crawl the actual MCI becomes
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Thus, we can see that also under a crawling peg domestic monetary conditions are to a large
extent determined by the real interest rate in the anchor country. Again we can compare the
actual and the optimum MCI:
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The main difference between the fixed rate and the crawls is the tem preceding  t α  which is
() ( ) t
*
t 1 π − π δ −  in the case of fixed exchange rates, 0 for the passive crawl, and () ( ) t
T 1 π − π δ −
for the active crawl.
4.4.3  Purely floating exchange rates
The currency crises that occurred under fixed and crawling pegs have led many economists to
favor a system of flexible exchange rates. As pronounced by the floating corner of the
inconsistency triangle, the advantage of this system is that interest rates can be set autonomously.
Thus, if the exchange rate behaved as predicted by economic theory (e.g. st = f (it, π t, ...), the
degree of monetary restriction would be perfectly controllable by the central bank’s interest rate
policy.
However, the experience with freely floating exchange rates since 1973 has led to the clear result
that in the short and medium-run there is no systematic relationship between economic
fundamentals (however defined) and the development of the exchange rate. Isard (1995, p. 138)
summarizes this evidence as follows:
“In short, neither the behavioral relationships suggested by theory, nor the information
obtained through autoregression, provided a model that could forecast significantly better50
than a random walk. And furthermore, while the random walk model performed at least as
well as other models, it predicted very poorly.”
In particular, empirical studies do not find any systematic relationship between the volatility of
exchange rates and the underlying “fundamental” volatility (see Flood and Rose 1995).
For the conduct of monetary policy in a small open economy the unpredictable behavior of the
exchange rate represents an important, but random determinant of its monetary conditions.
18 If
we apply the institutional setting of freely floating exchange rates (i.e. no interventions in the
foreign exchange market) together with the open economy aspects of Chapter 4.2.1 to our
monetary policy framework, we get the following MCI-based policy rule:
(72)  t
opt
t t q MCI r ∆ δ + = .
The central bank sets the interest rate according to
•   changing domestic macroeconomic conditions (
opt
t MCI , see equation (35)), and
•   the assumed relationship between interest rates and exchange rates (see for example
equation (7) in Chapter 3.2).
However, the crucial variable in equation (72) is ∆ qt. If the relationship between rt and ∆ qt is
stable and predictable, then the monetary policy makers have complete monetary autonomy, in
the sense that they can always generate the monetary conditions that are optimal. Otherwise, and
somewhat more realistic, the autonomy of independently floating exchange rates can be doubted.
To show this we follow the literature and assume that the exchange rate follows a random walk
in the short-run:
(73)  1 t t 1 t q q ~
+ + η + = ,
where ηt+1 is independently and identically distributed with E[ηt+1]=0 and a constant variance
Var[ηt+1]=
2
η σ . The tilde on qt+1 signifies that it is a random variable. Inserting equations (72) and
(73) into the basic MCI equation yields the following expression for the actual MCI:
(74)  () ( ) t 1 t t
opt
t t 1 t t t q q ~ q MCI q q ~ r MCI + − ∆ δ + = − δ − = + + .
                                                
18 Note that one of the major failures of exchange rate theory is the well known fact that real exchange rate
movements are largely determined by nominal exchange rate changes.51
Thus, the apparent advantage of an independent monetary policy is questionable and decreases
with a rising impact of real exchange rate changes on domestic monetary conditions. Instead of
achieving full control over the MCI, the actual MCI becomes a random variable for the monetary
policy authority that has the following properties:




t t MCI Var and MCI MCI E η σ δ = = .
Such an outcome can have different implications for the conduct of monetary policy. If the
central bank accepts the randomness of the MCI, this leads to a violation of the internal
equilibrium since the optimal MCI is only achieved randomly. On the other hand the central
bank can also react to changes of the actual MCI caused by exchange rate variations. This
requires that the interest rate is adjusted so that domestic equilibrium can be attained. But this
implies that the central bank has to give up its autonomous interest rate policy. Alternatively, the
central bank could temporarily adjust its inflation target (see equation (32)).
19 But a discretionary
deviation of the inflation target from its long-term value is only a synonym for the inability of
minimizing the central bank’s loss function, and hence a violation of the internal equilibrium.
4.5  Overcoming the inconsistency triangle through managed floating
As already mentioned, the inconsistency triangle postulates that a country can only attain one
side (i.e. one pair of attributes) of the triangle: capital controls, fixed exchange rates or pure
floating. But it says nothing about the possibility of adopting some sort of intermediate regime.
Frankel (1999, p. 7) has mentioned this flaw of the current debate:
“There is nothing in existing theory, for example, that prevents a country from pursuing a
managed float in which half of every fluctuation in demand for its currency is accommodated
by intervention and half is allowed to be reflected in the exchange rate.”
                                                
19 This option was perceived by the literature on inflation targeting in open economies. Ball (1999b, p. 139) writes:
“In practice, countries with inflation targets do not formally adjust for exchange rates in the way suggested here.
However, adjustments may occur implicitly. For example, a central-bank economist once told me that inflation
was below his country’s target, but that this was desirable because the currency was temporarily strong, and policy
needed to ‘leave room’ for the effects of depreciation.” Unfortunately, authors like Svensson and Ball never
discuss the possibility of foreign exchange market interventions in cases of fundamentally not justified deviations
of the exchange rate path. This reluctance seemingly stems from the conviction that the strategy of inflation
targeting is characterized by the abandonment of traditional intermediate targets, and that every attempt to target a
certain kind of exchange rate or exchange rate path would undermine this strategy.52
Our discussion has shown that the solution to the inconsistency triangle is not a halfway house
between half-stability and half-independence. Instead an integrated approach is required where
the optimum interest rate level and the optimum exchange rate path are determined
simultaneously. Thus, managed floating allows to convert the inconsistency triangle into a
consistency triangle with the following three corners: capital mobility, an autonomously
determined monetary conditions index and an exchange rate path which follows the interest rate
differential.
Figure 8: Consistency triangle
capital mobility
monetary autonomy




4.6  Unresolved issues of managed floating
While managed floating offers several important advantages compared with traditional exchange
rate strategies, it is certainly not a panacea which could solve all problems of the international
monetary order. The main weaknesses of this framework are the following:
•   As the central bank does not announce an exchange rate path, the exchange rate can no
longer be used as an anchor for private sector expectations which is especially useful in
the situation of a disinflation.
•   As a the control over the exchange rate is asymmetric, a central bank can lose the control
over the macroeconomic situation if it is confronted with very strong capital outflows.
•   As each central bank or government decides autonomously over the exchange rate, there
is a serious risk that managed floating is misused for a beggar-my-neighbor policy which
can undermine the aims of the WTO.53
We will shortly discuss these three topics.
4.6.1  In search of a new anchor for private sector expectations
In the 1980s monetary targeting and exchange rate targeting were regarded as ideal devices for
establishing a transparent and credible monetary framework in larger and smaller currency areas
respectively. As far as monetary targeting is concerned, many central banks decided to substitute
it by inflation targeting as a more comprehensive strategic approach (Bernanke et al 1999,
Bofinger 2001). Our analysis of traditional exchange rate strategies has shown that the
conditions under which a fixed or a crawling peg can constitute an optimum policy strategy are
rather restrictive. Especially as an approach for disinflation a fixed rate can be applied only as
long as there is a sufficiently high risk premium. But if the risk premium declines faster than the
inflation differential, a fixed rate offers a potential for speculative inflows and makes it at the
same time very costly for a central bank to defend the peg with sterilized interventions. This was
exactly the situation with which many emerging market countries were confronted in the 1990s.
While managed floating can avoid such problems, by its very nature it cannot provide an anchor
for private sector expectations. Thus, if managed floating is regarded as an optimum solution in
terms of achieving internal and external equilibrium, an additional institutional device is
required. The most obvious solution is inflation targeting which provides an anchor for
expectations by a public announcement of the inflation target that the central bank intends to
achieve.
There is nothing that prevents a combination of managed floating and inflation targeting. As
shown by Ball (1999b), inflation targeting in an open economy requires that the central bank sets
monetary conditions in way that a given inflation target can be achieved. Managed floating
provides a framework that allows to generate such monetary conditions in way that is compatible
with external equilibrium.
As Schaechter et al. (2000) have shown there are already several emerging market countries that
have adopted this approach: Brazil, Chile, the Czech Republic, Israel, Poland, and South Africa.
All of them are now independent or managed floaters according to the IMF’s classification.54
4.6.2  The control over the exchange rate is asymmetric
The most serious flaw of managed floating as we have described it here is the asymmetric
control over the exchange rate. As we have shown in the previous Chapters, a central bank’s
ability to avoid an unwanted depreciation is limited by the stock of its exchange reserves (and
the availability of balance of payments credits). Thus, a central bank could always be confronted
with a situation of a major crisis of confidence which forces it to accept a depreciation that
exceeds its exchange rate target path by far. An example for such a crisis is the depreciation of
the rupiah in 1997/98 from 2,500 rupiah per US-dollar in July 1997 to over 15,000 rupiah per
US-dollar in mid-July 1998.
The monetary conditions index shows that a very strong depreciation leads by itself to an
inflationary stance of monetary policy. From the logic of the MCI such a shock must be
counteracted by a strong increase of the interest rate. As the MCI is constructed under the
assumption of a perfect substitutability of the interest rate and the exchange rate lever, such a
policy switch would not be problematic.
In reality, this substitutability is questionable, above all if the required degree of substitution is
very high. While the exchange rate mainly affects the international sector of the economy
(exporters and import substitution), the interest rate affects the whole economy. A policy shift
leading to a strong real depreciation and a very high real interest rates implies an extremely
restrictive impulse for the domestic sectors of the economy (the banking system because of its
maturity transformation, the services and the construction sector, and the government which is
often heavily indebted and often also in a foreign currency). As the Asian crises has shown, such
an overly restrictive effect on the domestic sectors of the economy can transform a currency
crisis into a financial sector crisis.
Thus, under managed floating countries remain vulnerable to crises of confidence which can be
generated simply by contagion effects. The newly created IMF credit facilities (the Supplemental
Reserve Facility and as a precautionary device the Contingent Credit Line) can provide countries
with financial resources that are not subject to the usual limits but are based on the actual
financing needs. However, a surcharge of 300 up to 500 basis points is applied for such funds
and the member country has to repay these credits within 2 ½ years at the very latest. Given the55
rather strict eligibility criteria for the CCL
20 one could ask whether countries that are qualified
for CCL could be completely or partially dispensed from the repayment of such credits if a clear
contagion effect can be diagnosed.
4.6.3  Managed floating and beggar-my-neighbor policies
With the widespread practice of managed floating by IMF member countries the international
monetary order has experienced a profound change. By its very nature managed floating implies
unilaterally decided exchange rate policies that are not discussed in the public domain. This
gives governments ample scope for exchange rate policies that are not only designed by
macroeconomic considerations but also by trade-related aspects. Since exchange rate changes
have similar effects as tariffs, managed floating makes it possible to circumvent the regulations
of the WTO.
The very fact that the foreign exchange reserves of developing countries have increased from
330 billions of US-dollar in 1990 to 1,170 billions of US-dollar in 2000
21 shows that in the
longer run exchange rate policies were dominated by the desire to keep the national currencies
on an undervalued basis. The increasing United States current account deficits reflects the risks
for those countries which follow a unilateral policy of benign neglect in a world where most
other countries have clear targets for their exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar.
Thus, managed floating requires a comprehensive surveillance of national exchange rate policies
by the International Monetary Fund or even by the WTO. Without a clear theoretical framework
for managed floating and a “neutral” exchange rate policy it will be not easy to detect strategic
exchange rate policies. We hope that the empirical methods and the theoretical considerations
presented in this paper can provide a basis for such an approach.
                                                
20 See IMF (2000, p. 67): “(...) the eligibility criteria confine potential candidates for a CCL to those members
implementing policies considered unlikely to give rise to a need to use IMF resources; whose economic
performance— and progress in adhering to relevant internationally accepted standards—has been assessed
positively by the IMF in the latest Article IV consultation and thereafter; and which have constructive relations
with private sector creditors with a view to facilitating appropriate private sector involvement.”
21 These figures are taken from the IFS (line 1l s, country code 200). As they were listed in SDRs, we multiplied
them by the average annual US-dollar/SDR exchange rate.56
5  Selected case studies
In the preceding Chapter we presented a rather normative approach for explaining the behavior
of central banks that operate within the two extremes of the broad spectrum of exchange rate
regimes. Our managed floating framework considered the exchange rate as an independent
monetary policy tool in addition to the traditional short-term interest rate. Moreover, we defined
two equilibrium conditions that shall be guaranteed by the contemporaneous interaction of the
central bank’s exchange rate and interest rate policy. However, one questions still remains
unanswered: Do countries really behave the way we propose?
In Chapter 2 a central result of our cross-country study was, that an important number of
countries makes intensive use of its foreign reserves to manage a certain path for the exchange
rate. Chapter 4.1 showed that most of the managed floaters that we identified as such with our
methodology, indeed controlled both operating targets at the same time. We found that the
overwhelming part of the liquidity effects of interventions were sterilized by the monetary policy
authority. In Chapter 4.2 we finally specified the conditions that the exchange rate path and the
interest rate have to meet. Thus, in this Chapter we concentrate on these two remaining aspects:
•   do the countries really follow an exchange rate path that is compatible with UIP, and
•   do the countries manage their instruments in order to create the appropriate domestic
monetary conditions?
In the following, we pick out four of the most interesting managed floaters and present their
strategies in a descriptive approach. Clearly, our choice is somewhat arbitrary, but for the
purpose of demonstrating our ideas most convincingly, Slovenia, Peru, Poland, and Japan
appeared to be quite instructive. The figures that we refer to can all be found in Appendix 6:
Selected case studies.
5.1  Slovenia
The Slovenian monetary and exchange rate policy is an excellent example for a strategy of
managed floating. Since the beginning of the transition process the Bank of Slovenia followed a
kind of shadow targeting of the tolar with an undeclared path and margin and the German mark
as reference currency. In June 1993 it officially appeared as a managed floater for the first time
in the IMF classification. As can be seen from the UIP chart in Figure 11, the depreciation path57
D(s) of the Slovenian currency was for the most part of the period under consideration in line
with the interest rate differential vis-à-vis Germany, adjusted by a positive, but small risk
premium. As long as there was an excess supply of foreign currency in the foreign exchange
market, the Bank of Slovenia intervened with a view to realizing the desired exchange rate path.
Our index of floating characterizes these periods with a value of around +0.67. In the second half
of 1995 the tolar started to depreciate substantially. Intervention activity was reduced, and the
interest rate differential was widened so as to stop a further depreciation. But this change in the
policy mix that was triggered by the asymmetric control option over the exchange rate, did not
lead to a violation of the internal equilibrium condition. Even though real interest rates rose, this
restrictive stance was counteracted by a real effective depreciation so that the MCI still reflected
the underlying macroeconomic situation (see the MCI chart in Figure 11).
From 1999 on the rate of depreciation of the tolar exceeded the interest rate differential for the
first time. Being aware of the limited effectiveness of prolonged foreign exchange market
interventions in such circumstances, the Bank of Slovenia again sharply reduced its intervention
activity with a tendency of net sales of foreign reserves. The nominal depreciation directly
resulted in an expansionary impulse from the exchange rate channel of monetary transmission
which is reflected in a decline of the MCI. As a consequence, inflation rates immediately rose
from 5 to over 10 per cent, and real growth was stimulated. In terms of our model presented in
Chapter 4, both equilibrium conditions, the internal equilibrium and the external equilibrium,
were clearly violated. But what would have been the appropriate policy response, given the
inability of the central bank to directly stop the depreciation of the domestic currency? In our
view the Bank of Slovenia should have raised its interest rates as it has done likewise in 1995/96.
Such a step would directly balance the external disequilibrium through an increase of the
demand for domestic currency. But also domestic monetary conditions would become more
restrictive.
5.2  Peru
Peru started its stabilization program in the early 1990s after several years of extremely high
inflation rates. The official Peruvian exchange rate strategy according to the IMF publications
was an independent float since June 1990. But a short look at the intervention activity chart in
Figure 12 indicates with no doubt that the management of the exchange rate played a major role
in the monetary policy strategy of the Central Reserve Bank of Peru. From 1994 on, as inflation58
rates fell back on moderate levels, the interest rate policy and the exchange rate path were
permanently in accordance with the requirements of the external equilibrium condition. The
difference between the two lines in the UIP chart of Figure 12 can be interpreted as a rough
proxy for the risk premium that investors demand for Peruvian assets as opposed to US
investments. The index of floating shows that the intervention instrument was mainly used to
realize the desired exchange rate path. The peak in the interest rate differential in 1998 is again a
good example for the asymmetric ability of central banks to control the exchange rate. Capital
outflows (triggered by the Russian and Brazilian crisis which exacerbated the anxiety of
investors towards emerging market economies) induced a strong depreciation of the sol which
could only be stopped by raising short-term interest rates. As soon as the depreciation came to
rest, the interest rates were returned to old levels. Interestingly, it seems that since that time
interventions were mainly used to smooth exchange rate movements since I
float hardly left the
±  0.33 band.
5.3  Poland
Poland is also a very interesting example of an analysis of a central bank’s exchange rate policy.
The underlying sample of our study covers two de jure exchange rate regimes: From December
1991 to March 2000 Poland officially declared its exchange rate regime as managed floating
(Poland 1 in our classification), whereas from April 2000 on the Polish authorities decided to let
the Polish currency float freely without any foreign exchange market interventions (Poland 2).
Within the managed floating period, Poland started with a crawling peg against a basket of five
currencies. In May 1995, it introduced a crawling band which was gradually widened from ±  7
per cent to finally ±  15 per cent. This increased flexibility of the exchange rate system is directly
reflected in the behavior of the exchange rate of the Polish zloty vis-à-vis the currency basket
(see Figure 13, lower chart) which started to fluctuate considerably from 1998 on. But also the
charts of our two indices S
abs and I
float yield the same results. After a period of heavy intervention
activity in the mid 1990s which was aimed at perfectly controlling the depreciation path of the
Polish currency, interventions seemed to be more and more a tool to simply smooth out undue
exchange rate swings. Finally, from late 1998 on, intervention policy was entirely banned from
the central bank’s set of instruments so that the de facto switch to a purely floating exchange rate
regime was already completed more than one year before the official change.59
From the UIP chart we can see that the external equilibrium condition was violated for most part
of the period considered. The average rate of depreciation of the zloty exceeded the interest rate
differential vis-à-vis Germany significantly until mid 1994. Intervention activity remained rather
low during that time which again reflects the asymmetry already mentioned earlier. But also
interest rates remained low if one judges this on the basis of the real rates from the upper right
hand chart in Figure 13. Thus, the overall policy stance as measured by the MCI was quite
expansionary which was certainly due to the low growth performance in the first years. The
situation changed with the beginning of the second half of 1994 as capital flows discovered
Poland. The National Bank absorbed only a part of the foreign exchange excess and therefore
tolerated a gradual reduction of the depreciation of the zloty. As a result, monetary conditions
became more restrictive, the disinflation process sped up, and output losses occurred in the first
two quarters of 1996. From late 1996 on, with the beginning of a capital flow reversal, the
central bank tried to counteract the depreciation pressure by augmenting its nominal interest
rates. The MCI further rose and real growth dropped. In 1998, the situation turned again, and as
before, the Polish authorities accepted the appreciating pressure on the zloty. From late 1998 on,
the National Bank even stopped all intervention activity. Since that time, the UIP chart
additionally reveals another typical feature of purely floating exchange rate systems: The
relationship between the interest rate differential and the exchange rate path became very
unstable, and sometimes, even though the interest rate differential remained positive in the order
of 10 to 15 per cent, the nominal exchange rate of the zloty appreciated vis-à-vis the basket
currencies.
To summarize, in our view the major deficit of the Polish strategy was simply the disregard of
the external constraint. Each time when capital inflows exerted appreciating pressure on the zloty
(1995, first half of 1998), the National Bank made no attempts to guarantee a UIP compatible
exchange rate path. The correct policy mix according to our framework would have been
•   either a reduction of the interest rate differential without directly influencing the
exchange rate path
•   or the maintenance of an exchange rate path via sustained interventions (purchases of
foreign exchange) that is compatible with a risk premium adjusted interest rate
differential
•   or a mixture of both.60
In all cases, the change in the policy mix should have avoided the overly restrictive monetary
policy stance that is reflected in our MCI line.
5.4  Japan
As last example for managed floating activity we shortly present Japan (see Figure 14). As we
already mentioned in Chapter 2.4.3, a closer analysis of the time series of our two indices can
lead to interesting results, especially if the underlying observation period is long. In the right
hand chart of Figure 14 we depicted the index of floating only if the overall intervention activity
exceeded 1.00. The results are striking: Each time when the Bank of Japan decided to intervene
in the foreign exchange market, either to stop an appreciation of the yen (I
float > 0) or to avoid a
depreciation (I
float < 0), it maintained this policy over period of at least several months so that the
absolute value of I
float almost always exceeded 0.33. In other words, if the Bank of Japan made
use of its intervention instrument, its objective was clearly to target a certain path of the
exchange rate rather than smoothing some form of excessive volatility. These findings are
clearly in contrast to the results of the Calvo and Reinhart (2000) study who classified the
Japanese exchange rate policy as independently floating, that is to say with a very low overall
intervention activity.
6  Conclusion
After the experience with the currency crises of the 1990s, a broad consensus has emerged
among economists that such shocks can only be avoided and capital mobility be maintained if
countries adopt either floating exchange rates or very hard pegs (currency boards, dollarization).
As a consequence of this view which has been enshrined in the so-inconsistency triangle (or
“unholy trinity”) all intermediate currency regimes are now regarded as inherently unstable. As
far as economic theory is concerned, this view has the attractive feature that it not only fits nicely
with the logic of the traditional Mundell-Fleming model but also that for both corner solutions
(flexible exchange rates with a domestically oriented interest rate policy; hard pegs with a
completely exchange rate oriented monetary policy) solid theoretical frameworks have been
developed. Finally the IMF’s statistics seem to confirm that indeed intermediate regimes are less
and less in fashion by both industrial countries and emerging market economies.61
However, in the last few years an anomaly has been detected which seriously challenges this
new paradigm on exchange rate regimes. In their influential cross-country studies, Calvo and
Reinhart (2000) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000) have shown that many of those
countries which had declared themselves as “independent floaters” in the IMF statistics were
indeed heavily intervening on foreign exchange markets. Thus, in most cases “floating” means
“managed floating”.
This insight and the lack of literature about “managed floating” was the starting point for our
study. We first developed a set of indicators that allows us to differentiate further between three
forms of floating:
•   Pure floaters completely refrain from foreign exchange market intervention.
•   Independent floaters intervene in order to smoothen short-term swings in exchange rates
but they allow the market to determine the path of the external value of their currency.
•   Managed floaters are characterized by the fact that also the exchange rate path is mainly
determined by the central bank.
Our empirical analysis which extends and refines the Calvo/Reinhart approach comes to the
result that many developed and emerging market economies can be regarded as managed
floaters. In other words, the international monetary order is currently dominated by managed
floating. This has important implications for economic theory and economic policy. As far as
theory is concerned, managed floating is very different from the textbook versions of both fixed
and flexible exchange rates.
•   Compared with flexible exchange rates (or pure floating) the central intervenes
sometimes very often and also with high quantities on the foreign exchange market in
order to target a path for the exchange rate.
•   Compared with fixed exchange rates (or also crawling pegs) the central bank does not
announce its target path. In other words, there is no pre-commitment in the exchange rate
policy. Instead of such a rule-based approach, a completely discretionary exchange rate
management is adopted.62
Thus, managed floating can no longer be explained with the Mundell-Flemig model (above all
because it is a comparative static model) nor with standard theories of fixed exchange rates or
flexible exchange rates (including the more refined models of open economy inflation targeting).
Therefore, we have tried to develop a simple theoretical framework for managed floating. At the
level of a central bank’s operating targets it is based on the assumption that to some extent a
simultaneous targeting of the nominal short-term interest rate and the nominal exchange rate is
possible. Since the latter is rather controversial, above all because of the literature on sterilized
interventions, we show in detail under which conditions a targeting of the exchange rate is
possible. This is the case above all, if
•   the currency is under a pressure of strong inflows, i.e. it is appreciating by more than a
target rate set by the central bank;
•   the central bank disposes over a large sterilization potential;
•   the costs of intervention are low; this is the case if the target path for the exchange rate is
compatible with the interest rate differential.
In the next step we develop a monetary and exchange rate policy framework which is grounded
on the general logic of the Mundell-Fleming, but which neglects fiscal policy. It is based on the
assumption that the two levers of a central bank (exchange rate, interest rate) have to be so as to
fulfill internal and external equilibrium simultaneously:
•   As for the internal equilibrium, both operating targets have to be set in a way that
minimizes a typical loss function of a central bank. We introduced an MCI as a combined
measure of the actual monetary policy stance that results from both, the real interest rate
and the real exchange rate.
22 More precisely, we define the internal equilibrium condition
as an MCI rule which we derive in accordance with a real interest rate rule for a closed
economy. In other words, internal equilibrium requires that the short-interest rate and the
exchange rate path are set in way that an optimum MCI is realized.
•   As for the external equilibrium, the exchange rate path and the interest rate have to be set
in a way that they correspond with the interest rate differential vis-à-vis the anchor
currency. This avoids short-term profit opportunities of international investors and thus
                                                
22 As we assume sticky prices in the short-run, we assume that the real exchange rate and the real interest rate can be
perfectly controlled by the nominal interest rate and the nominal exchange rate63
helps to prevent speculative inflows (which can often turn into outflows). At same time
this rule keeps the cost of sterilization as low as possible.
Thus, given two equations and two endogenous policy variables we can derive target values for
the exchange rate path and the interest rate. They show above all that the optimum path for the
exchange rate depends on the foreign real interest rate, the inflation differential, the optimum
MCI and the risk premium. In other words, exchange rate paths determined by a simple rule
(fixed rates, active or passive crawls) as well as pure floating are always inferior to such a
discretion in exchange rate policy.
We show this by comparing the strategy of managed floating to absolutely fixed exchange rates
and purely floating. We come to the result that both extreme cases are only optimal (in the sense
of our internal equilibrium condition) under country-specific conditions. In contrast to this,
managed floating offers an integrated approach where the advantages of both corner solutions,
namely control over the exchange rate and control over domestic monetary conditions, can be
combined.
In a final section we discuss several unresolved issues of managed floating. First, as the central
bank does not announce an exchange rate path, the exchange rate can no longer be used as an
anchor for private sector expectations. Thus, in the same way as the abandonment of rules for the
money supply has paved the way for inflation targeting, a discretionary approach towards
exchange rate targeting could also be accompanied with a switch to inflation targeting. In fact,
same of the countries which manage their exchange rate have already introduced inflation
targeting. Second, as a the control over the exchange rate is asymmetric, a central bank can lose
the control over the macroeconomic situation if it is confronted with very strong capital
outflows. This shows that managed floating is not a complete substitute for international co-
operation in exchange rate policy. The newly introduced credit lines (contingent credit line) of
the IMF can be regarded as an important step into this direction. Third, as each central bank or
government decides autonomously over the exchange rate, there is a serious risk that managed
floating is misused for a beggar-my-neighbor policy which can undermine the aims of the WTO.
The very strong increase in the foreign exchange reserves of developing countries in the 1990s is
a strong indication that such incentives are rather strong. At the same time the growing current
account surplus of the United States shows the negative consequences for those countries that
follow a completely passive exchange rate policy in an environment that is dominated by64
managed floating. Thus, managed floating is also not a prefect substitute for international
coordination of exchange rate polices. On contrary, it makes this even more urgent than fixed
rates or purely flexible rates.65
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Appendix 1: Country coverage
Table 8: IMF exchange rate classification of developed and emerging market economies
Country Period IMF data
availability
Country Period IMF data
availability
Argentina 10/78 - 12/90 if Mexico 3 12/94 - 11/00 if 12/94 - 09/00
Australia 1 07/82 - 11/83 mf Morocco 09/80 - 03/90 mf
Australia 2 12/83 - 11/00 if New Zealand 04/85 - 11/00 if 04/85 - 10/00
Brazil 1 03/90 - 09/94 if Nigeria 1 07/82 - 08/86 mf
Brazil 2 10/94 - 09/98 mf Nigeria 2 09/86 - 12/93 if
Brazil 3 01/99 - 11/00 if Nigeria 3 03/98 - 11/00 mf not available
Bulgaria 02/91 - 06/97 if 06/94 - 06/97 Norway 1 12/92 - 06/95 if
Canada 01/75 - 11/00 if Norway 2 09/95 - 11/00 mf
Chile 1 09/82 - 06/99 mf Pakistan 02/82 - 09/99 mf 02/82 - 04/99
Chile 2 09/99 - 11/00 if Peru 06/90 - 11/00 if
Colombia 1 01/75 - 06/99 mf Philippines 1 10/78 - 12/84 mf
Colombia 2 09/99 - 11/00 if Philippines 2 12/84 - 11/00 if 12/84 - 10/00
Czech Republic 06/97 - 11/00 mf 06/97 - 10/00 Poland 1 12/91 - 09/98 mf
Ecuador 1 03/89 - 11/95 mf Poland 2 04/00 - 11/00 if
Ecuador 2 12/95 - 01/99 mf Portugal 01/75 - 03/92 mf
Ecuador 3 04/99 - 01/00 if Russia 1 07/92 - 06/95 if not available
Egypt 06/87 - 09/98 mf Russia 2 07/95 - 12/97 mf
Finland 09/92 - 09/96 if Russia 3 09/99 - 11/00 if
Greece 1 12/82 - 12/95 mf Singapore 12/87 - 11/00 mf
Greece 2 01/96 - 12/97 mf Slovenia 06/93 - 11/00 mf
Hungary 06/95 - 08/00 mf 06/95 - 08/00 South Africa 01/83 - 11/00 if
India 1 02/79 - 02/93 mf Spain 07/82 - 12/87 mf
India 2 03/93 - 11/00 if Sri Lanka 10/78 - 11/00 mf 10/78 - 10/00
Indonesia 1 05/83 - 06/97 mf Sweden 12/92 - 11/00 if
Indonesia 2 09/97 - 11/00 if 09/97 - 04/00 Switzerland 04/79 - 11/00 if 04/79 - 10/00
Israel 1 03/84 - 03/87 mf Thailand 1 06/97 - 03/98 mf
Israel 2 12/91 - 11/00 mf 12/91 - 09/00 Thailand 2 03/98 - 11/00 if
Italy 09/92 - 09/96 if Turkey 01/80 - 11/00 mf 01/80 - 09/00
Japan 01/75 - 11/00 if United Kingdom 1 01/75 - 09/90 if
Korea 1 03/80 - 10/97 mf United Kingdom 2 09/92 - 11/00 if 09/92 - 09/00
Korea 2 12/97 - 11/00 if United States 01/75 - 11/00 if
Malaysia 06/93 - 03/98 mf Venezuela 1 03/89 - 03/93 if
Mexico 1 02/83 - 10/91 mf Venezuela 2 06/93 - 06/94 mf
Mexico 2 11/91 - 11/94 mf Venezuela 3 06/96 - 11/00 mf 06/96 - 08/0068
Table 9: Number of observations
n = 6 n = 12 n = 6 n = 12
n o r m a l i z a t i o n  m e t h o d 1212 n o r m a l i z a t i o n  m e t h o d 1212
Argentina 142 142 136 136 Mexico 2 37 37 37 37
A u s t r a l i a  1 1 21 2 6 6 M e x i c o  3 6 56 75 96 1
Australia 2 199 199 193 193 Morocco 109 109 103 103
Brazil 1 50 50 44 44 New Zealand 182 182 176 176
B r a z i l  2 4 64 64 04 0 N i g e r i a  2 8 28 27 67 6
B r a z i l  3 1 81 81 11 1 N i g e r i a  3 4 64 64 04 0
Bulgaria 13 32 7 26 Norway 1 26 26 20 20
Canada 311 311 311 311 Norway 2 58 58 52 52
Chile 1 197 197 191 191 Pakistan 202 202 196 196
Chile 2 10 10 4 4 Peru 121 121 115 115
Colombia 1 294 294 294 294 Philippines 1 70 70 64 64
Colombia 2 10 10 4 4 Philippines 2 186 187 180 181
Czech Republic 36 36 30 30 Poland 1 89 89 83 83
Ecuador 1 76 76 70 70 Poland 2 3 3 0 0
Ecuador 2 38 38 38 38 Portugal 207 207 207 207
E c u a d o r  3 5500 R u s s i a  2 2 5 2 5 1 9 1 9
Egypt 131 131 125 125 Russia 3 10 10 4 4
Finland 44 44 38 38 Singapore 151 151 145 145
Greece 1 152 152 146 146 Slovenia 85 85 79 79
Greece 2 24 24 24 24 South Africa 210 210 204 204
Hungary 58 58 52 52 Spain 60 60 54 54
India 1 164 164 158 158 Sri Lanka 260 260 254 254
I n d i a  2 8 88 88 28 2 S w e d e n 9 19 18 58 5
Indonesia 1 165 165 159 159 Switzerland 254 254 248 248
I n d o n e s i a  2 2 73 42 12 8 T h a i l a n d  1 6 6 0 0
I s r a e l  1 3 23 22 62 6 T h a i l a n d  2 2 82 82 22 2
Israel 2 101 101 95 95 Turkey 244 244 238 238
Italy 44 44 38 38 United Kingdom 1 189 189 189 189
Japan 311 311 311 311 United Kingdom 2 92 92 86 86
Korea 1 207 207 201 201 United States 311 311 311 311
Korea 2 31 31 25 25 Venezuela 1 44 44 38 38
Malaysia 53 53 47 47 Venezuela 2 8 8 2 2
Mexico 1 100 100 94 94 Venezuela 3 46 46 40 4069
Appendix 2: Probability distributions
Table 10: Probability distribution of S
abs1(6)
S≤ 0.5 S≤ 1.0 S≤ 1.5 S≤ 2.0 S≤ 0.5 S≤ 1.0 S≤ 1.5 S≤ 2.0
United States 99.04 100.00 100.00 100.00 India 1 3.05 17.07 57.32 85.98
United Kingdom 2 89.13 100.00 100.00 100.00 Ecuador 2 2.63 26.32 57.89 84.21
Canada 73.63 100.00 100.00 100.00 Colombia 1 2.38 23.47 42.52 62.93
Poland 2 33.33 100.00 100.00 100.00 Switzerland 1.97 17.32 39.37 62.99
United Kingdom 1 64.02 84.66 95.24 98.94 Spain 1.67 33.33 75.00 91.67
Japan 60.45 86.50 96.78 100.00 New Zealand 1.65 32.97 56.04 71.43
Colombia 2 60.00 60.00 100.00 100.00 Chile 1 1.52 15.23 40.10 70.05
South Africa 50.00 93.81 100.00 100.00 Philippines 1 1.43 40.00 74.29 94.29
Korea 1 49.76 93.72 100.00 100.00 Philippines 2 0.54 29.57 63.44 80.65
Singapore 40.40 88.08 100.00 100.00 Pakistan 0.50 26.73 51.98 79.70
Mexico 3 32.31 86.15 89.23 93.85 Portugal 0.48 30.43 71.50 90.82
Malaysia 28.30 54.72 64.15 79.25 Chile 2 0.00 30.00 100.00 100.00
Australia 2 28.14 71.36 87.94 94.47 Hungary 0.00 29.31 56.90 77.59
Indonesia 1 26.06 73.94 86.06 95.76 Venezuela 2 0.00 25.00 37.50 62.50
Slovenia 22.35 76.47 94.12 100.00 Russia 2 0.00 24.00 56.00 96.00
Czech Republic 16.67 80.56 100.00 100.00 Mexico 1 0.00 24.00 49.00 69.00
Egypt 16.03 25.19 33.59 41.98 Finland 0.00 22.73 50.00 72.73
Bulgaria 15.38 53.85 69.23 76.92 Israel 2 0.00 18.81 43.56 83.17
Indonesia 2 14.81 29.63 40.74 62.96 India 2 0.00 18.18 56.82 84.09
Thailand 2 14.29 53.57 96.43 100.00 Australia 1 0.00 16.67 50.00 91.67
Italy 13.64 79.55 100.00 100.00 Peru 0.00 13.22 38.84 61.98
Israel 1 12.50 25.00 37.50 62.50 Nigeria 2 0.00 12.20 30.49 57.32
Norway 1 11.54 30.77 46.15 65.38 Venezuela 1 0.00 11.36 34.09 45.45
Greece 1 11.18 24.34 39.47 59.21 Norway 2 0.00 6.90 46.55 63.79
Sri Lanka 10.77 58.46 80.77 93.85 Ecuador 1 0.00 6.58 21.05 44.74
Russia 3 10.00 30.00 80.00 100.00 Venezuela 3 0.00 6.52 13.04 32.61
Mexico 2 8.11 32.43 54.05 64.86 Argentina 0.00 2.11 6.34 12.68
Poland 1 6.74 40.45 87.64 97.75 Brazil 1 0.00 0.00 14.00 44.00
Sweden 6.59 48.35 78.02 94.51 Brazil 3 0.00 0.00 11.11 11.11
Nigeria 3 6.52 50.00 80.43 93.48 Brazil 2 0.00 0.00 10.87 23.91
Turkey 3.69 25.82 60.25 80.33 Ecuador 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00
Morocco 3.67 58.72 75.23 88.07 Greece 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Korea 2 3.23 54.84 70.97 83.87 Thailand 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0070
Table 11: Probability distribution of S
abs1(12)
S≤ 0.5 S≤ 1.0 S≤ 1.5 S≤ 2.0 S≤ 0.5 S≤ 1.0 S≤ 1.5 S≤ 2.0
United States 85.53 100.00 100.00 100.00 Colombia 1 0.00 0.00 4.76 15.65
United Kingdom 2 62.79 100.00 100.00 100.00 Pakistan 0.00 0.00 4.59 22.45
Japan 27.65 60.13 73.95 85.53 Israel 2 0.00 0.00 3.16 10.53
United Kingdom 1 20.63 59.79 76.72 87.30 Philippines 1 0.00 0.00 3.13 21.88
Canada 18.33 74.92 98.71 100.00 Portugal 0.00 0.00 2.90 20.77
South Africa 4.41 41.18 86.27 99.02 India 1 0.00 0.00 1.90 10.76
Korea 1 2.99 48.76 82.59 96.52 Chile 1 0.00 0.00 0.52 8.38
Egypt 2.40 15.20 21.60 22.40 Hungary 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.00
Indonesia 1 1.89 22.64 51.57 68.55 Spain 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.37
Mexico 3 1.69 28.81 84.75 86.44 Philippines 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.89
Australia 2 1.04 18.13 56.48 76.68 Mexico 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.64
Singapore 0.00 37.24 66.90 88.97 Finland 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.53
Malaysia 0.00 17.02 46.81 59.57 Switzerland 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.65
Slovenia 0.00 7.59 45.56 77.21 Nigeria 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.26
Greece 1 0.00 7.53 17.81 18.49 Russia 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.26
Sri Lanka 0.00 3.54 25.59 50.79 India 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.88
Sweden 0.00 2.35 21.18 34.12 Peru 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.48
Morocco 0.00 0.97 34.95 55.34 Venezuela 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.63
Korea 2 0.00 0.00 32.00 56.00 Australia 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Czech Republic 0.00 0.00 30.00 100.00 Norway 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Colombia 2 0.00 0.00 25.00 100.00 Argentina 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Italy 0.00 0.00 23.68 89.47 Brazil 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Nigeria 3 0.00 0.00 20.00 37.50 Brazil 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ecuador 2 0.00 0.00 18.42 23.68 Chile 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Poland 1 0.00 0.00 15.66 40.96 Russia 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bulgaria 0.00 0.00 14.29 42.86 Brazil 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Thailand 2 0.00 0.00 13.64 77.27 Ecuador 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Indonesia 2 0.00 0.00 9.52 19.05 Greece 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Turkey 0.00 0.00 7.14 24.37 Israel 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mexico 2 0.00 0.00 5.41 21.62 Venezuela 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
New Zealand 0.00 0.00 5.11 23.86 Venezuela 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Norway 1 0.00 0.00 5.00 30.0071





+ rank result IMF I 
- I 
0 I 
+ rank result IMF
Thailand 1 (*) 16.67 83.33 0.00 1 if mf Chile 1 25.89 35.03 39.09 32 mf mf
Switzerland 15.35 71.26 13.39 2 if if Philippines 2 28.49 34.95 36.56 33 mf if
Morocco 16.51 65.14 18.35 3 if mf Greece 1 27.63 34.21 38.16 34 mf mf
Ecuador 1 18.42 59.21 22.37 4 if mf Israel 2 34.65 33.66 31.68 35 mf mf
Mexico 3 21.54 50.77 27.69 5 if if Australia 2 41.21 33.17 25.63 36 mf if
Italy 20.45 50.00 29.55 6 if if Argentina 38.03 33.10 28.87 37 mf if
Philippines 1 45.71 50.00 4.29 7 if mf Sri Lanka 43.46 32.69 23.85 38 mf mf
Turkey 22.54 48.77 28.69 8 mf mf Bulgaria 38.46 30.77 30.77 39 mf if
Sweden 39.56 48.35 12.09 9 mf if Peru 20.66 30.58 48.76 40 mf if
Nigeria 3 26.09 47.83 26.09 10 mf mf Spain 20.00 30.00 50.00 41 mf mf
Slovenia 18.82 47.06 34.12 11 mf mf Poland 1 25.84 29.21 44.94 42 mf mf
New Zealand 29.12 46.70 24.18 12 mf if UK 1 46.03 28.04 25.93 43 mf if
Norway 2 34.48 46.55 18.97 13 mf mf India 2 25.00 27.27 47.73 44 mf if
Nigeria 2 24.39 45.12 30.49 14 mf if Finland 50.00 27.27 22.73 45 mf if
Ecuador 2 44.74 44.74 10.53 15 mf mf Colombia 1 38.44 26.19 35.37 46 mf mf
Brazil 3 33.33 44.44 22.22 16 mf if Egypt 29.01 25.95 45.04 47 mf mf
Russia 2 20.00 44.00 36.00 17 mf mf Singapore 34.44 25.17 40.40 48 mf mf
Greece 2 33.33 41.67 25.00 18 mf mf Venezuela 2 (*) 50.00 25.00 25.00 49 mf mf
South Africa 24.29 41.43 34.29 19 mf if Mexico 1 29.00 24.00 47.00 50 mf mf
Pakistan 32.18 40.59 27.23 20 mf mf Brazil 2 39.13 23.91 36.96 51 mf mf
Mexico 2 35.14 40.54 24.32 21 mf mf Israel 1 37.50 21.88 40.63 52 mf mf
Korea 1 28.02 40.10 31.88 22 mf mf Japan 29.26 21.86 48.87 53 mf if
Colombia 2 (*) 50.00 40.00 10.00 23 mf if Venezuela 1 25.00 20.45 54.55 54 mf if
Hungary 43.10 39.66 17.24 24 mf mf Australia 1 (*) 0.00 16.67 83.33 55 mf mf
Czech Republic 38.89 38.89 22.22 25 mf mf Korea 2 9.68 16.13 74.19 56 mf if
Norway 1 15.38 38.46 46.15 26 mf if Indonesia 2 22.22 14.81 62.96 57 mf if
Indonesia 1 21.82 38.18 40.00 27 mf mf Malaysia 60.38 11.32 28.30 58 mf mf
Portugal 28.99 37.20 33.82 28 mf mf Thailand 2 39.29 10.71 50.00 59 mf if
Venezuela 3 32.61 36.96 30.43 29 mf mf Russia 3 (*) 0.00 0.00 100.00 60 mf if
India 1 46.95 36.59 16.46 30 mf mf Ecuador 3 (*) 20.00 0.00 80.00 61 mf if
Brazil 1 10.00 36.00 54.00 31 mf if Chile 2 (*) 100.00 0.00 0.00 62 mf if
Note:




 0 and I
 + stand for Prob(I
float1 ≤  -0.33), Prob(0.33 < I
float1 < 0.33) and Prob(I
float1 ≥  0.33)
respectively.
!  The ranking was made according to I
 0.72





+ rank result IMF I 
- I 
0 I 
+ rank result IMF
Morocco 3.88 93.20 2.91 1 if mf Brazil 1 0.00 47.73 52.27 32 mf if
Czech Republic 3.33 90.00 6.67 2 if mf Brazil 2 25.00 47.50 27.50 33 mf mf
Nigeria 3 5.00 90.00 5.00 3 if mf Israel 2 20.00 47.37 32.63 34 mf mf
Switzerland 7.26 87.50 5.24 4 if if Singapore 18.62 46.90 34.48 35 mf mf
Ecuador 1 0.00 84.29 15.71 5 if mf Sri Lanka 33.07 46.46 20.47 36 mf mf
Norway 2 17.31 78.85 3.85 6 if mf Australia 2 36.79 45.08 18.13 37 mf if
Mexico 2 2.70 78.38 18.92 7 if mf India 1 43.67 44.94 11.39 38 mf mf
Greece 2 12.50 75.00 12.50 8 if mf Argentina 33.09 43.38 23.53 39 mf if
Turkey 7.56 72.27 20.17 9 if mf Poland 1 15.66 40.96 43.37 40 mf mf
Italy 10.53 71.05 18.42 10 if if Mexico 1 26.60 37.23 36.17 41 mf mf
South Africa 9.31 68.63 22.06 11 if if Slovenia 15.19 36.71 48.10 42 mf mf
Russia 2 5.26 68.42 26.32 12 if mf Peru 13.91 35.65 50.43 43 mf if
New Zealand 19.89 66.48 13.64 13 if if Israel 1 19.23 34.62 46.15 44 mf mf
Portugal 12.56 65.22 22.22 14 if mf Finland 42.11 34.21 23.68 45 mf if
Korea 1 14.93 65.17 19.90 15 if mf Colombia 1 33.33 30.61 36.05 46 mf mf
Venezuela 3 15.00 65.00 20.00 16 if mf India 2 20.73 30.49 48.78 47 mf if
Canada 18.65 63.99 17.36 17 if if Egypt 23.20 30.40 46.40 48 mf mf
Pakistan 19.90 63.78 16.33 18 if mf Venezuela 1 10.53 28.95 60.53 49 mf if
Greece 1 10.27 63.70 26.03 19 if mf UK 1 46.03 28.04 25.93 50 mf if
Sweden 35.29 63.53 1.18 20 if if Japan 26.37 27.33 46.30 51 mf if
Hungary 36.54 61.54 1.92 21 if mf Brazil 3 72.73 27.27 0.00 52 mf if
Ecuador 2 31.58 60.53 7.89 22 if mf Malaysia 59.57 25.53 14.89 53 mf mf
Norway 1 5.00 60.00 35.00 23 if if Thailand 2 40.91 18.18 40.91 54 mf if
Mexico 3 13.56 59.32 27.12 24 if if Indonesia 2 0.00 14.29 85.71 55 mf if
Philippines 2 18.33 56.67 25.00 25 if if Bulgaria 42.86 14.29 42.86 56 mf if
Philippines 1 43.75 56.25 0.00 26 if mf Korea 2 0.00 12.00 88.00 57 mf if
Indonesia 1 13.21 55.97 30.82 27 if mf Australia 1 (*) 0.00 0.00 100.00 58 mf mf
Nigeria 2 22.37 53.95 23.68 28 if if Russia 3 (*) 0.00 0.00 100.00 59 mf if
Spain 5.56 53.70 40.74 29 if mf Chile 2 (*) 100.00 0.00 0.00 60 mf if
Colombia 2 50.00 50.00 0.00 30 if if Venezuela 2 (*) 100.00 0.00 0.00 61 mf mf
Chile 1 16.75 49.74 33.51 31 mf mf
Note:




 0 and I
 + stand for Prob(I
float1 ≤  -0.33), Prob(0.33 < I
float1 < 0.33) and Prob(I
float1 ≥  0.33)
respectively.
!  The ranking was made according to I
 0.73
Appendix 3: The market maker principle
For a clear understanding of daily turnover figures on foreign exchange markets it is important to
know how these markets are organized. The most important feature is the “market-maker”
principle. It means that all participants at the interbank foreign exchange market are ready to buy
and sell foreign exchange without limit at any moment, irrespective whether they are actually in
need of additional positions in foreign or domestic currency. As each participant is able to get rid
of an unwanted position immediately, the risks of being a market maker is very limited. This
organization of the foreign exchange market has the effect that it blows up the total turnover. As
the chart below shows, the order e.g. of a German firm that wants to sell 100 euro for dollars can
lead to many intermediate transactions between the market markers until this position reaches a
bank that needs euro deposits for its customer.
Figure 9: Illustration of the market maker principle
    Bank A
       Bank H    Bank B Company 2
Company 1 Bank G    Bank C      wants
            100 euro
wants    Bank F Bank D
100 US $
    Bank E
Sequence:
Company 1        G        H        D        F        A        C        E        H        B         Company 2
Multiplier: 9
Turnover:  900 US $
Because of the speed with which the intermediate transactions are carried out, the multiplier
between an outside transaction and the internal transactions can be very high. By the same token,
any foreign exchange intervention by a central bank will also have a strong multiplier effect.
23
                                                
23 See Vitale (1997, p. 7): “In the week 3-7 August 1992, in which particular events were not reported in the press,
the average daily volume of transactions with clients of Merrill Lynch in D-marks for dollars was around $ 174
Thus, it makes very little sense to compare the stock of foreign exchange reserves with daily
turnover on foreign exchange markets.
                                                                                                                                                            
billion, while their average size was about $ 4 million. These figures indicate that with a relatively small market
order the central bank can affect the quotes of a single market maker. Then, if this market maker has the
reputation of receiving market orders form the central bank, inter-dealer transactions will propagate this effect on
the quotes of other dealers.”75
Appendix 4: Derivation of the optimal MCI based on the minimization of a
central bank’s loss function
The loss function was defined in equation (30) as follows:




t t 1 t y ~ L π − π χ + ε − χ = .
Under full information we can replace 
S
t t y ~ ε −  by  () t 1 t t p E p − − β  (see equation (26)). The loss
function becomes










t 1 t t
2
1 t E p E p L π − π χ + π − π β χ = π − π χ + − β χ = − − .
From the first-order condition of equation (77) we get
(78)  ()
T
t 1 t t E 1 γπ + π γ − = π − ,
where  ( ) 2
2
1 2 χ + β χ χ = γ . Assuming rational expectations (Et-1π t = Et-1π
T) the optimal inflation
rate is






t E E π − π γ + π = π − − .
The associated price forecast error is




t 1 t t E p E p π − π γ = − − − .
Thus the optimal MCI is defined as










t E 1 MCI π − π δ βγ − ε − ε δ = − .76
Appendix 5: A simple framework for the explanation of currency crises
Our model provides relatively simple explanations for the emergence of currency crises under a
framework of fixed exchange rates. An obvious reason for a crisis is a monetary policy that
violates the external equilibrium by pursuing an interest rate policy that leads to a domestic
interest rate that is lower than the rate required by UIP. The result are capital outflows and a loss
of reserves. As soon as the central bank’s reserve stock is exhausted the peg has to be
abandoned. Since this can be anticipated by the markets, a speculative attack will occur and
require a premature exit. All this is captured in the first generation currency crisis models (see
Krugman 1979) with the only difference that these models are normally written for the monetary
base (or net domestic assets) as the operating target of the central bank.
An alternative explanation refers to the internal equilibrium. We can see from equation (61) that
under fixed rates the actual monetary conditions index of a country is given by






t r 1 MCI + α + π − π δ − = .
Thus, the stance of monetary policy depends on the inflation differential, the risk premium, and
the cyclical situation in the anchor currency. If we look at the short-term real interest rate in the
United States which reflects such cyclical effects we can see that in the early 1970s and the years
1991 –1994 the stance of the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy was extremely expansionary
(see Figure 10). In other words, countries pegging to the dollar were in principle forced to pursue
a similarly lax monetary policy. However, one can observe that e.g. the Bundesbank in 1970-73
and several Asian countries in 1992-96 tried to keep their interest rates at higher levels by
sterilized interventions. As a result a compromise solution emerged which violated both
equilibria simultaneously: interest rates were too low for domestic macroeconomic stability, they
were too high for avoiding speculative inflows. This made the pegs highly vulnerable, especially
since in the Asian cases domestic investors used the low dollar rates for the financing of
investment expenditures.
A similar logic, but in the opposite direction was at work in the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM) crises in 1992/93. Because of German unification the Bundesbank pursued a
very restrictive interest rate policy. The other ERM members gave priority to external
equilibrium, since an autonomous interest rate policy with lower rates would have led to reserve77
losses (see Table 14). The result was a severe violation of the internal equilibrium since the other
members had much less cyclical overheating than Germany. The markets realized that this policy
stance was unsustainable and increased the risk premium for countries like France and Belgium.
This caused a further divergence between the actual and the optimum MCI and made the peg
even less sustainable. In the literature these processes are described in the second generation
currency crisis models.
















































































































































Table 14: Taylor interest rates and actual short-term interest rates in 1991








Note: Taylor interest rate calculated with the original Taylor formula
() t t t t y ~ 5 . 0 2 5 . 0 2 i + − π + π + = .
Data source: OECD, Economic Outlook78
Appendix 6: Selected case studies
Figure 11: The case of Slovenia


















































































































































































































































































































































































Slovenia - Real growth rate
































































































































































































































































































Foreign reserves (right scale)
Sources and data description: see note after Figure 1479
Figure 12: The case of Peru












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Nuevo sol/USD (left scale)
Foreign reserves (right scale)
Sources and data description: see note after Figure 1480
Figure 13: The case of Poland








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Poland - Real growth rate































































































































































































































































































































































Foreign reserves (left scale)
Zloty/basket (daily, right
Sources and data description: see note after Figure 1481
Figure 14: The case of Japan












































































































































































Sources and data description of Figure 11 to Figure 14:
Most of the data are taken from the IFS. Exceptions from this are:
-  Slovenia, Real effective appreciation (Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and
Development, Ljubljana);
-  Poland, Real growth rate (Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Vienna, Focus on Transition,
various issues); note that the figures from 1992 to 1995 are yearly averages;
-  Poland, Daily Zloty/basket exchange rate (National Bank of Poland, Warsaw).
The chart labelled “UIP path” shows the nominal depreciation of the domestic exchange rate in
the last 12 months and the difference between the actual domestic money market rate and the
actual foreign money market rate. As foreign country we chose Germany for Slovenia, the US
for Peru and the basket (45% US, 35% Germany, 10% UK, 5% France and 5% Switzerland until
December 1998; 45% US and 55% Euro area since January 1999) for Poland. In the case of
Peru, we took the central bank’s discount rate instead of the money market rate.
The MCI in the upper right hand chart of Figure 11 to Figure 13 was constructed as follows: In
all three cases we weighted the real interest rate relative to the real appreciation according to the
degree of openness. As Slovenia is the most open economy (external sector’s size relative to
GDP in 1998: 49%) the weights are assumed to be the same (1:1). For Poland with a degree of
openness of 23% we applied a relative weight of 2:1 (real interest rate to real exchange rate), and
for Peru with a degree of openness of only 11% 3:1. In order to calculate the real interest rate we
subtracted the actual inflation rate from the nominal lending rate. The lending rate was chosen as
it is assumed to be more informative as a measure of the influence of monetary instruments on
macroeconomic variables in the transmission process as for example described by the bank82
lending literature. The real exchange rate lever was calculated as a one year aback change of the
real exchange rate. In the cases of Poland and Slovenia we used real effective exchange rates, in
the case of Peru the bilateral US-Peruvian real exchange rate. All real exchange rates are CPI
based.
Note that in the charts labelled “Index of floating” we only depicted the bars if the overall
intervention activity was higher than 1.0. As we defined an activity index of below 1.0 as non-
interventionist, a distinction between exchange rate targeting and exchange rate smoothing on
the basis of the index of floating appeared to make no sense. This is especially relevant in the
case of Japan and Poland.